Azerbaijani forces attacked the breakaway and long-disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. Less than a month later, and the region is now all but deserted.
The declared aim of the attack was to eliminate the last forces of the Armenian-majority self-styled republic. The lightning “anti-terror operation,” as Azerbaijan called it, precipitated the collapse of the breakaway republic. Most importantly — given that it came after a debilitating blockade that lasted for almost nine months — it instilled fear among the Karabakh Armenian population.
Many fled their ancestral homeland.
As an endless convoy of cars transporting desperate refugees filled the winding road to an uncertain future away from their homes, regional entities were lining up to influence the future shape of the South Caucasus region on the border of eastern Europe and west Asia. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has been unfolding there for decades.
Aliyev’s regime
In Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliyev has been investing heavily in cultivating nationalism and militarism over the past few years to shore up his authority and his regime.
Starting from the second Karabakh war in 2020 until the present, Azerbaijan’s Border Service and Armed Forces used inspirational pop music videos to glorify the government’s military posturing and patriotic films to incite nationalism.
After Azerbaijan’s 2020 victory effectively cut off Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia — leaving only one precarious point of access to the outside world, the Russian-policed Lachin corridor — the international community urged a negotiated peace settlement that would ensure Nagorno-Karabakh’s reintegration to Azerbaijan in exchange for local self-government.
But Aliyev’s preference for military action was no surprise, since a self-governed Nagorno-Karabakh would have required conflict resolution that was at odds with his preferred authoritarian and centralized governance approach over the rest of Azerbaijan.
Aliyev’s boldness was enabled by Russia’s and Turkey’s interests. Both are intent on regional peacemaking. This allows them to maintain their dominance in the South Caucasus region and keeps both the European Union and the United States at arm’s length.
Russia, Turkey influence
Russia and Turkey have developed a model I call “managed competition” in the South Caucasus to ensure their often competing objectives don’t undermine their common goal to exclude states with opposing interests.
They worked together during the 2020 conflict to ensure they were the only powers to have a presence by stationing peacekeeping and monitoring forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin corridor, albeit Turkey assumed a lesser and mostly symbolic role. The Turks are intent on doing so now as well.
The “two states, one nation” slogan used by Turkey and Azerbaijan to emphasize the ethnic kinship of their people underlies their strategic partnership, including co-ordination on foreign policy, energy and defence.
Turkey supported Azerbaijan with arms and by training the Azerbaijani Armed Forces in both the 2020 and 2023 conflicts.
Azerbaijan, in turn, has helped Turkey reduce its energy dependence on Russia and Iran by boosting its own gas exports.
Both Russia and Turkey regard military action in Nagorno-Karabakh as an opportunity to open the Zangezur corridor — a land bridge between the Nakhcivan (the only part of Azerbaijan sharing a border with Turkey and largely dependent on it) and the rest of Azerbaijan that will effectively provide a link between the two countries.
An increasingly isolated Russia sees in a friendly Azerbaijan a crucial link to Iran and its Persian Gulf ports and a valuable ally that gives it strategic depth in the South Caucasus.
By sacrificing its traditional alliance with Armenia and acquiescing to Azerbaijani aggression, Russia wants to convince Aliyev not to undermine Russia’s strategy of disrupting western natural gas supplies.
Furthermore, the destabilizing effect of a tense relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan strengthens Russia’s role as an arbiter in the region.
Stoking nationalism
Aliyev knows how to stir nationalist fervour, and he’s likely to continue creating tensions if Russia allows him to.
He’s already been designating territories in Armenia as “western Azerbaijani lands” and vowed to work for “the return” of western Azerbaijanis to Armenia.
Another reason Russia is turning a blind eye to Azerbaijan’s military posturing — including its occupation of 50 square kilometres of Armenian territory — is the effect it has in destabilizing the current Armenian government.
Russia considers Armenia a reluctant ally that’s increasingly looking westwards. Already, Armenia’s pro-Russian opposition anticipates the demise of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and its return to power, despite its history of corruption and cronyism.
If the current developments provide any indication of what a post-conflict scenario underwritten by Russia and Turkey will look like in the region, the picture is bleak.
Russia and Turkey opt for containment, not peace and reconciliation, and so tensions will likely intensify in the South Caucasus until the next opportunity to forge a genuine peace presents itself.
Spyros A. Sofos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
