Whoever declared that in this world “nothing is certain except death and taxes” plainly led a sheltered life. Some authorities say Benjamin Franklin coined the phrase, but it was probably first voiced by the memorably named Toby Guzzle, a comedic character in Christopher Bullock’s 1716 English farce, The Cobbler of Preston.
With all due respect to Guzzle, war is a third inescapable, global certainty, as present-day citizens of Lebanon, Ukraine and Sudan know only too well. China’s expansionist regime is testing this proposition again in the choppy waters of the South China Sea. Maritime states from the Philippines to Japan struggle with Beijing’s aggression.
Conflict looks unavoidable. In truth, it has already begun. Western assessments of Asia-Pacific security flashpoints usually focus on China’s threats to seize Taiwan. North Korea’s nuclear arms and missiles are another key concern. South China Sea disputes are often overlooked – but are no less explosive.
Exactly why Xi Jinping, China’s president, appears intent on systematically, gratuitously provoking the neighbours and driving them into the arms of the US, his chief rival, is a puzzle. His actions demonstrate that mindless imperialist “gunboat diplomacy” did not end with Lord Palmerston et al.
Yet Xi’s reasons for attempting to colonise the South China Sea are not difficult to fathom. A vast basin ringed by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan, it harbours rich untapped oil, gas and mineral deposits and fisheries. A vital global export route, the sea also has prime strategic importance for China’s defence in its intensifying superpower standoff with the US. Defying international law, infringing other countries’ exclusive economic zones and rejecting rival claims to disputed islands, China says history is on its side in asserting sovereignty over almost the entire area.
Since Xi took power in 2012, Beijing’s approach has become increasingly confrontational. On the receiving end, more than most, is the pro-western Philippines government of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, who succeeded the more China-friendly Rodrigo Duterte as president in 2022. In an unusually violent clash in June at Second Thomas Shoal, in the Spratly Islands (which are inside Manila’s internationally recognised economic zone), Chinese coastguard sailors attacked, looted and damaged Philippine boats, wielding axes and knives. Luckily, no one was killed.
Despite an agreement to defuse tensions, another serious incident followed last month, at Sabina Shoal, also in the Spratlys, when a Philippine ship was rammed and holed. Sabina Shoal is 86 miles west of the Philippines coast – and more than 600 miles from China.
Persistent Chinese provocations have triggered a notable shift in Philippine policy. Marcos is hugging the US close, expanding the scope of a 2014 mutual defence pact while repairing or reinforcing relations with Vietnam, Brunei and other victims of Beijing’s bullying.
“Marcos has returned the country to its strategic moorings by granting the US access to four more military bases,” wrote Marites Dañguilan Vitug in Foreign Affairs. “He has overseen the largest-ever joint military exercises… Washington, for its part, has welcomed Marcos’s upholding of international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”
Sharp American criticism of China’s actions, and last year’s striking personal pledge to Marcos by Pentagon boss Lloyd Austin that the US “will always have your back in the South China Sea or elsewhere in the region” underline the potentially hazardous worldwide ramifications of these local disputes.
Xi’s expansionist policy is proving similarly counterproductive elsewhere. Japan recently protested against the presence of Chinese ships off the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, which are claimed by Beijing. In an unprecedented affront last month, a Chinese spy plane violated Japan’s airspace.
In response, like the Philippines, Japan is tightening US military ties, partly because its security and trade would be hugely affected were China to try to forcibly “reunify” Taiwan – as Xi says he wants to do before leaving office. “There’s no war scenario in which Japan wouldn’t be affected by China’s aggression against Taiwan,” wrote Alexander Görlach in Politico. “Not only is it very closely situated to the island nation, there are also around 54,000 US soldiers stationed in Japan, many of them on Okinawa. Washington has repeatedly declared it will support Taiwan militarily should Xi attack.”
As it steadily jettisons post-1945 pacifism, Japan is boosting defence spending and strengthening regional links, for example with its longtime sparring partner South Korea. It has joined the Quad, a security collaboration with India, the US and Australia, and maintains a “maritime dialogue” with Manila. US president Joe Biden was hosting a Quad leaders’ summit this weekend, focusing on the South China Sea.
As such bilateral, multilateral and mutually reinforcing defence links expand and solidify, regional politicians are talking up the idea of an “Asian Nato”. What a huge own goal that would represent for Xi. What is he thinking?
Perhaps the latter-day emperor of Beijing believes the neighbours will ultimately kowtow before China’s crude intimidation and superior economic power. Cambodia and Laos already belong to this category. Malaysia and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are pinning their hopes on diplomacy. An anticipated meeting of 20 foreign ministers on the sidelines of this month’s UN general assembly will discuss the Chinese maritime menace.
Perhaps Xi is pandering to nationalist sentiment and deflecting attention from domestic failures. Perhaps he calculates that, if push comes to shove, an increasingly self-absorbed America will not fight for the Philippines, Taiwan or other regional partners. He may not be far wrong, especially if unreliable, isolationist-minded Donald Trump returns to office.
Or perhaps, like Russia’s Vladimir Putin in Ukraine, Xi, exercising unchecked dictatorial powers and insulated from impartial advice and opposing arguments, is in the process of making a disastrous, world-shaking miscalculation.
War in general may be a historical certainty. But war right now in the South and East China Seas is wholly avoidable – if only China’s Communists would stop behaving like Victorian imperialists.
• Simon Tisdall is the Observer’s Foreign Affairs Commentator
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