Russia and Japan are at odds again, this time over a 50-ft granite statue that shows a Soviet soldier using the butt of his rifle to shatter a border post engraved with the Japanese chrysanthemum emblem.
Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, demanded that Russia remove the statue.
She said it was “unacceptable to erect a monument depicting the destruction” of the Chrysanthemum Crest, which is widely recognised as a symbol of Japan and the emblem of the Japanese imperial family.
Russia has strongly rejected the demand, framing the monument as legitimate historical memory of the Soviet Union’s 1945 victory over Japan and the end of the Second World War.
The statue was unveiled in southeastern Russia’s Khabarovsk on 4 September. The stone marker depicted being smashed by the Soviet soldier is based on former border posts that once divided the Sakhalin island in the Pacific Ocean, north of Japan. These posts divided the Japanese-controlled southern half of the island from the Soviet-controlled north.
The then Soviet Union seized the Japanese-controlled half in 1945, bringing the entire island under Soviet control.
Japan and Russia’s relation deteriorated following Tokyo’s sanctions on Moscow for its invasion of Ukraine. It raised questions about whether Russia’s increasingly assertive stance could push Japan towards a tougher position on Ukraine.
Paul Richardson, professor at the University of Birmingham who authored a book on the Kuril Islands dispute, tells The Independent the unveiling of this new monument reflects a “markedly worse atmosphere in relations between Russia and Japan”.
“Fashioned in the Soviet socialist realist style, with a Red Army soldier smashing his rifle butt against a border marker with the chrysanthemum symbol of Japan, it’s hard to deny its aggressive and triumphalist tone,” Richardson says.
Japan’s foreign minister, Toshimitsu Motegi, says it was “extremely regrettable” that Russia had not responded to Tokyo’s request to remove the monument, but said Japan would continue to press Moscow to do so.
“Such a statue is not constructive in relation to Japan. In particular, the chrysanthemum crest is widely recognised as an emblem symbolising Japan,” he says.
“The installation of a monument depicting its destruction is unacceptable and extremely regrettable in terms of Japanese national sentiment. Through diplomatic channels, we have strongly requested the Russian side to cease the installation and remove it.”
Takaichi, who is regarded as a nationalist prime minister, faces pressure from conservatives in Japan to take a stronger stance against Moscow.
The Kremlin has already rejected the demand.
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov says: “It is difficult to say what they have forgotten and what they remember in Tokyo, but at least we have not forgotten. We have not forgotten Japanese militarism and the victory we achieved over it.”
Maria Zakharova, director of the Russian foreign ministry’s press department, also rejected Japan’s objection and told Tokyo not to “interfere”.
“Japan should repent forever,” she says.
The monument also reflects what some experts see as a change in the way Moscow commemorates the Second World War, as well as a distraction from the war in Ukraine ahead of upcoming parliamentary elections in Duma.
James Brown, a professor at Temple University Japan, says this is part of Russia’s effort to increasingly align itself with China, and commemorating the defeat of Japan fits into a broader Russia-China-North Korea alignment against Japan.
“The new monument fits a pattern of greater Russian emphasis on the war against Japan in 1945,” Prof Brown says.
“For most of the post-war period the Soviet-Japan war received little attention in Russia compared to the Soviet victory in Europe. This is not surprising given that it only lasted a week before Japan announced its intention to surrender.
A few years ago, however, Moscow began to place greater emphasis on victory over Japan, likely due to Russia’s increased closeness to China, he says.
“This is especially worrying for Tokyo because it means China and Russia (and North Korea) making common cause against it,” he adds.
He notes that Russia even moved its commemoration of the end of the Second World War and victory over Japan to 3 September, bringing its date in line with Beijing’s.
Under Takaichi, ties between China and Japan hit rock bottom after the prime minister suggested that a Chinese military attack or naval blockade on Taiwan could constitute an "existential crisis" for Japan. It sparked a diplomatic crisis with Beijing.
Akihiro Iwashita, professor at Hokkaido University, argues that she has “almost no original diplomatic policy of her own” and her verbal slip on Taiwan “was a blunder rather than diplomacy”.
“The premise that she wants to project a tough stance against Russia is misleading; in reality, she simply does not seem to care much about Russia,” he claims.
The latest major blow came when Russian president Vladimir Putin visited the disputed Kuril Islands in August – his first visit to the islands, which Japan calls the Northern Territories.
Japan protested against the visit, with Takaichi describing it as an offence to the feelings of the Japanese people.
Putin’s visit was notable because he had previously refrained from visiting the disputed islands, unlike other senior Russian politicians.
Both Brown and Richardson see the shift as being driven by both domestic politics and Russia’s desire to punish Japan for its support for Ukraine.
Brown says Putin wanted to generate patriotic fervour in Russia’s Far East ahead of the Duma elections from 18-20 September. “The message of the visit from Moscow is, if you’re going to act contrary to our national interests, we’ll harm your national interests in return,” he says.
Richardson says: “Against the background of upcoming parliamentary elections, and a distraction from the war in Ukraine, which has now run for longer than the Great Patriotic War (to defeat Nazi Germany in Second World War), a deliberate political choice was made over its style and tone.”
This raises the question of whether Tokyo could respond by strengthening its support for Ukraine.
Some Japanese conservatives have called for stronger backing for Kyiv following Putin’s visit to the island.
Kiyofumi Iwata, former military chief of staff, wrote an article in the right-wing Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, denouncing it as “an outrageous action designed to justify the former Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan … and its illegal occupation of the Japanese territories after the war”.
Iwata criticises Takaichi’s response as “limited to verbal protests” despite Russian “openly trampling on Japan’s sovereignty and public sentiment”.
He calls on Takaichi to “make Russia feel pain” by supplying Ukraine with air defence weapons and jointly developing drone technology.
Brown says Japan could use measures such as increased military assistance or a high-profile meeting between Takaichi and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to send a political message to Moscow.
Japan’s concerns are found in its energy imports from Russia.
Tokyo is a major importer of liquefied natural gas, meeting 70 per cent of its energy needs through imports. Japan imported around nine per cent of its LNG from Russia in 2025.
“With economic pressures at home, including inflationary trends and a weakening yen, Japan would like to access cheaper energy. The closure of the Staits of Hormuz intensifies these pressures. Despite relations being as bad as they are, the export of Russian hydrocarbons to Japan likely remains of interest to both sides,” Richardson says.
