The recent deadly attack in Russia has shed light on the U.S. intelligence community's practice of the 'duty to warn,' which obliges officials to share knowledge of imminent threats, regardless of the target's identity. Two weeks before the tragic incident at a concert hall in Moscow, the U.S. had warned Russia of extremists' plans for a large-scale attack. Despite this warning, the attack claimed over 130 lives, with the Islamic State's affiliate in Afghanistan claiming responsibility.
The duty to warn gained prominence after al-Qaeda's attacks in 1998, leading to a formal directive in 2015. This directive mandates the sharing of impending threat information with relevant parties, with exceptions for extreme cases where disclosure could endanger lives or operations.
Under the Biden administration, threat-sharing with other governments has increased, aiming to bolster allies and deter adversaries. However, the duty to warn doesn't guarantee action from the receiving end, especially with adversarial relationships. Past instances, such as warnings to Iran and Venezuela, highlight the challenges of cooperation in the face of shared threats.
Despite efforts to enhance intelligence diplomacy, historical distrust between Russia and the U.S. has hindered effective threat response. Instances like the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, where a Russian warning about an extremist threat was not adequately followed up by U.S. officials, underscore the complexities of cross-border threat communication.
The duty to warn remains a critical tool in preventing catastrophic events, emphasizing the importance of proactive threat-sharing and international cooperation in combating terrorism and violence.
