
I read and much enjoyed—and highly recommend—my Stanford colleague Diego Zambrano's book, How Americans Enforce the Law. He was kind enough to write up for us this post that captures the core of his argument, and I'm delighted to pass it along (though I encourage people to read the whole book):
The headlines are full of stories about a federal government retreating from enforcement. Agencies are dropping investigations, abandoning regulations, shrinking staffs and changing enforcement priorities. One week, the EEOC dropsdiscrimination cases. The next week, the SEC and CFPB wind down investigations into securities fraud and wrongdoing affecting consumers. Critics fear that the Department of Justice's antitrust division will overlook mergers when it is convenient for the administration. And the DOJ has abruptly reduced enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Facing these changes, Americans might worry that a wide range of laws will go unenforced.
But that concern misses something unique about the American system of government. We have never relied only on bureaucrats to enforce our laws.
All the way back to the colonial period, American legislators have repeatedly done something unusual: they have given ordinary people the right to sue alongside government officials. In almost every regulatory area that most Americans care about—be it regulation of wages and hours, environmental pollution, consumer protection, or securities fraud—statutes allow both government officials and private parties to file suit to enforce the law. All of this happens through little-known provisions called "private rights of action," which is just a technical name for a right to sue. Thousands of these provisions build a second enforcement system alongside the bureaucracy, turning employees, consumers, competitors and their lawyers into co-enforcers of public law.
This system of private enforcement of the law is highly unusual. In much of the rest of the world, whenever a government faces a regulatory problem, it typically empowers government officials and bureaucrats to police legal violations. In France, Germany, Japan, and even the UK, legislators are far less likely to let anyone sue over, say, environmental pollution or employment discrimination.