The collapse of western funding for international aid–for both emergency humanitarian operations and official development assistance (ODA)–is a major blow. The dramatic consequences for the neglected populations are the result of the structural weaknesses–evident for years [1]–of an economic model of international aid and development whose obsolescence is now plain for all to see. What is particularly dramatic, however, is the abrupt, non-negotiated manner in which the procedures and targets of the withdrawals have been determined.
The “four temptations” inherent to the financial system in force to date [2]–and now unashamedly embraced by the new US administration–are obvious: the “western-centrism” of the donor countries; the “neo-liberal approach” to international aid where each contributing state chooses which countries to help; the “security concerns” about payments which are governed by strict control procedures to prevent such payments falling into the hands of the enemies of donor countries in conflict areas; and the “temptation to withdraw” funding whenever donor countries experience a major upheaval (Covid-19, economic crises, the rise of nationalism and isolationism, etc.). These trends converge to generate a volumetric insufficiency and suspicions of political soft power in the countries contributing to the annual budgets [3].
Of course, this is a disaster for international aid and development actors themselves, both in terms of feeling responsible for abandoning the activities developed in the field, and in terms of the redundancy plans that have already hit some of the organisations. Some of these organisations will clearly not survive the current events: even those with little or no reliance on USAID (the US development agency whose aid was ordered frozen for 90 days) will potentially be affected by the knock-on effects of the withdrawal of the leading donor country.
