South Africa’s long-governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), performed disastrously in the country’s May 2024 elections. Its electoral fortunes are now tied to regaining support in Gauteng, the most populous and economically important province, which it had governed with outright majorities since 1994. In 2024 the ANC’s Gauteng result of 34.8%, along with its 17% in KwaZulu-Natal, sealed the party’s loss of its national outright majority.
We asked political scientist Susan Booysen for her perspective on the ANC’s battle for Tshwane, a metropolitan municipality in Gauteng. It’s also the administrative seat of the national government, where the party used a newly constituted coalition to topple the Democratic Alliance mayor, Cilliers Brink.
What lies behind the Gauteng ANC’s toppling of the DA mayor of Tshwane?
For the ANC (African National Congress) to regain majority electoral support, much will depend on the Gauteng province’s populous base. The three Gauteng metropolitan municipalities of Tshwane, Johannesburg, and Ekurhuleni are key in this project. Besides constituting South Africa’s financial hub and having huge budgets, these metropolitan councils (metros) symbolise the country’s cultural heartbeat, and are a gateway to the rest of the continent.
The ANC’s political control of these bases has been lessening. It fears further lapses may make the losses irreversible. It lost outright control of the Gauteng metros in 2016: it slipped to 49% in Ekurhuleni, 46% in Johannesburg and 41% in Tshwane. The 2021 local elections confirmed both the ANC’s slide and rule by unstable coalition governments.
Since the 2021 elections, the metros have had multiple coalition governments. The ANC has, through coalition, reclaimed control of the top council positions in Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni.
What does the toppling of Brink say about internal ANC party dynamics?
Following their national coalition agreement of June 2024, parties to the coalition government have been discussing cascading the agreement to the provincial and local levels. These talks have been inconclusive.
The ouster of the mayor of Tshwane was not explicitly or publicly condoned by the ANC’s national leadership. Neither did they stop it. The Tshwane crisis exposes the ANC’s internal party dynamics.
The ANC in the province and in the Tshwane council constituted an alternative alliance – between the party, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and ActionSA. ActionSA broke its previous alignment with the Democratic Alliance in favour of the ANC.
Jointly the ANC, EFF and ActionSA hold 117 out of the 214 Tshwane council seats. They used this majority to pass a motion of no confidence against Brink and, in effect, his entire mayoral committee. A small band of one-seat parties reinforced Brink’s ejection.
The Tshwane development highlighted one of the key faultlines in the government of national unity: the Gauteng ANC’s disdain for the unity government agreement. The national unity government comprises the ANC, DA, Inkatha Freedom Party, Patriotic Alliance, Freedom Front Plus and five other tiny parties. The agreement has the support of the majority in the ANC’s national executive committee (NEC), its highest decision-making body between elective conferences.
The NEC had originally been strongly divided on forming a coalition with the DA.
After being elected Gauteng premier with the support of the DA, Panyaza Lesufi constituted the Gauteng executive with the Patriotic Alliance, Rise Mzansi and Inkatha Freedom Party. It excludes the DA.
Lesufi had offered the DA executive posts that would have placed it in a minor and subjected position in the province. The ANC’s national leadership accepted this. The DA rejected it.
What are the implications for ANC-DA cooperation in the national government and other municipalities?
The DA is fighting to have Cilliers Brink reinstated as mayor of Tshwane. It argues that the ANC’s capturing of the position threatens the unity government.
The DA appears to be angling for a fairer dispensation within the overall coalition formation, given its importance as the second largest party in the coalition government, rather than rejection of the GNU government. The DA needs the coalition as much as the ANC does.
The coalition government’s statement of intent, and how it is reflected in the lower provincial and municipal levels, are the key issue at stake.
The Tshwane crisis stands in the context of other local governments where new alliances are forming outside the formula of the national coalition government.
The crisis is in all probability not threatening the national coalition. But it may result in the fleshing out of the generally vaguely defined and minimalist Statement of Intent (the coalition agreement). In recent weeks more clarity has already emerged regarding conflict resolution in the unity government. The Tshwane crisis is likely to show whether and how the national level agreement resonates provincially and locally.
In fact, the lesson from the Tshwane coalition fiasco might be that there ought to be no expectations that the coalition government’s formula of approximate proportionality among its constituent parties will be reflected in the executives of the lower-level structures.
The DA stressed at the time of Brink’s removal that it had been in discussions with ANC national secretary general Fikile Mbalula and ANC negotiator David Makhura – and progress had been made for the two parties to jointly “stabilise” the Gauteng metros (read “exercise power-sharing”). It may have entailed the DA supporting the ANC in Ekurhuleni, and the ANC the DA in Tshwane.
But the proposal came to naught when the ANC proceeded to capture Tshwane, which it last governed in 2016.
The effect of the Tshwane fallout is likely to be heightened instability in South Africa’s metro councils. Without ANC-DA cooperation, much of the coalitions detente that had become possible in the wake of the national coalition agreement may dissipate. Instead, alternating coalition governments, through motions of no confidence, may proliferate.
The instability caused by such party political tit-for-tats and coalition musical chairs, both in the large metropolitan councils and the local municipalities, will contribute to citizens suffering poor delivery of services – although it is not the sole cause.
What does the ANC’s failure to sing from the same hymn book mean for the party?
The Tshwane crisis goes to the heart of the struggles unfolding in the ANC.
The ANC of 2024 is inherently unstable as it fights for electoral survival.
Its national executive committee and presidency act in ways that hint at them lacking the power to call the shots in relation to coalitions in some provinces and municipalities; and reining in its Gauteng premier and provincial executive committee.
This, as the party is trying to position itself favourably, through leadership changes, ahead of its national general council meeting next year, and its elective conference of 2027, in the hope of reversing electoral declines in local, provincial and national elections.
Besides KwaZulu-Natal’s centrality to this process, Gauteng holds the base of ANC succession given that it is political home to its deputy president, Paul Mashatile, and Lesufi.
The search for a new mayor for Tshwane unleashed a candidacy contest within the ANC. ANC mayoralty candidates are proliferating. They are emerging from the ranks of the politically powerful, anointed by high-level ANC power holders, along with candidates in the local ANC party structures and in the council itself.
The legacy of the 2016 violent struggles and mayhem in the city amid anger about succession are invoked to justify some proposals. These struggles seem oblivious to new coalition contexts, and the ANC’s loss of majority power.
Unless the fractious and divided ANC finds a united and consistent voice on coalitions, it may lose out on the possibility of using coalitions to regain electoral support. Unless the ANC in Gauteng is using the metros to confirm its alternative to the national formula.
Susan Booysen in the past had received funding from HSRC, via various (completed) university projects; and has until recently been employed full-time by MISTRA.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
