Dmitri Alperovitch joins the Cyberlaw Podcast to discuss the state of semiconductor decoupling between China and the West. It's a broad movement, fed by both sides. China has announced that it's investigating Micron to see if its memory chips should still be allowed into China's supply chain (spoiler: almost certainly not). Japan has tightened up its chip-making export control rules, aligning them with U.S. and Dutch restrictions, all with the aim of slowing China's ability to make the most powerful chips. Meanwhile, South Korea is boosting its chipmakers with new tax breaks, and Huawei is reporting a profit squeeze.
The Biden administration spent much of last week on spyware policy, Winnona DeSombre Berners reports. How much it actually accomplished isn't clear. The spyware executive order restricts U.S. government purchases of surveillance tools that threaten U.S. security or that have been misused against civil society targets. And a group of like-minded nations have set forth the principles they think should govern sales of spyware. But it's not as though countries that want spyware are going to have a tough time finding it, I observe, despite all the virtue signaling. Case in point: Iran is getting plenty of new surveillance tech from Russia these days. And spyware campaigns continue to proliferate.
Winnona and Dmitri nominate North Korea for the title "Most Innovative Cyber Power," acknowledging its creative use of social engineering to steal cryptocurrency and gain access to U.S. policy influencers.
