Consider this example, from the philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s book, Justice for Animals: Our Collective Responsibility. An animal, Susan, goes about her life, doing all the things that an animal of Susan’s sort would. But while pursuing her goals, she runs into various hurdles, a few frivolous, and unimportant to her life, and a few that are more serious — an illness, a storm that wrecks her home, and so forth. So far, it is clear that while Susan has met with problems, she has not suffered injustice. But, say, just as Susan is going about her business, another creature encroaches on her space, stops her from reaching her goals. We might still not have entered the realm of injustice. What, though, if Susan’s home was destroyed deliberately by a creature that ought to have known better? Suppose Susan was kept captive in unsanitary conditions, was not allowed to walk about, and suffered violence at the hands of the other creature. Nussbaum says, if Susan were a human being, it would be apparent to us that she had suffered injustice. Should the fact that she is a non-human animal matter? Should not our conception of justice make space for Susan?
Editorial | Judging jallikattu: On the Supreme Court verdict
If we were to see the law as a way of achieving justice, one would think that our ideation of constitutional rights will partake a commitment to welfare not just of human beings, but of other animals too. No doubt the text of the Constitution, the rights that it guarantees, are aimed at “persons”. To confer personhood on animals will unquestionably bring with it various vexing quandaries. Should this, though, stop us from seeing the Constitution as a tool for ensuring justice for animals? Is there not enough room available within the abstract guarantees of the Constitution for a more enlightened approach to animal welfare?
