I’ve just returned from Washington DC, where the level of anxiety about the presidential election is sky high. Almost as high as it is in Europe. Elections in the US are by far the most influential globally and the region that will be affected most is Europe (followed by Asia Pacific). The ripples from the election on security, the economy and democracy will be felt across the continent more than in any other part of the world.
Aware of this, European policymakers and pundits in Brussels and national capitals have been fretting for more than a year. But we have worried more than we have taken action. And we have focused on some possible repercussions more than others.
Furthermore, while we have concentrated almost exclusively on what Donald Trump’s re-election might mean, we actually believe deep down that Kamala Harris will scrape through even though we have not put much thought into what a Harris administration might look like.
Most European planning has gone into the potential impact on the economy, such as detailed thought on how the EU might react to a tariff war with the US under a second Trump presidency. It would probably start with a mix of generous offers at the negotiating table, followed by retaliatory measures were these to fail. However, two questions remain.
If the US did ramp up tariffs on the EU, how would European countries manage this against the backdrop of an already escalating EU trade war against China? And how would they react to a possible three-way economic war, for instance with the US applying secondary sanctions on EU products that rely on Chinese components or technology?
If the worst is averted and Harris is elected, Europeans have rather lazily assumed that Joe Biden’s (mildly protectionist) approach to trade, investment and industry would continue. While this may or may not be true, it is unclear what kind of coordination could be established or strengthened with the US to ensure that Europeans would not find themselves on the back foot, as they were in 2022 with the passing of the US inflation reduction act, which threatened the EU’s burgeoning green industries by shifting investment to the US.
Turning to security, this is the area that triggers by far the most European anxiety. Understandably so. Whereas few of us believe that the US would actually pull out of Nato under a second Trump term, few of us doubt that Washington would abandon Ukraine to its fate, possibly leading to a Russia-US deal over the heads of Ukrainians and other Europeans. Couching this surrender as “peace” might also lead to European division between those who would (wisely) see this as a stitch-up that would allow Vladimir Putin to prepare to take his next gulp of European territory, and others who, whether out of weakness or conviction, would follow the Trump-JD Vance line of surrendering Ukraine.
Precisely because the security and political implications for Europe could be so grave, Trump’s re-election might be sufficiently traumatic for Europeans to actually make a leap in defence integration. This is something the French president Emmanuel Macron has been promoting for many years under the headline of European strategic autonomy. More practically, the issue is how EU funding and regulations – as well as a possible EU-UK security pact – could be harnessed to support a European pillar within Nato.
Tragically, hardly any thought has gone into what the security implications of a Harris presidency might be. For sure, there would be no abrupt US disengagement from Ukraine and Nato. But there would probably be a gradual US pullback, making the jump-start on an integrated European defence strategy just as important.
And here comes the catch-22: whereas a Trump presidency would make Europeans much more willing to pull together on defence but less likely to succeed with a hostile administration across the Atlantic, a Harris presidency would make Europeans much less willing to integrate their defence even though success is more likely given that Europeans would have an ally in the White House.
The shock waves of the US election and its aftermath will also reverberate across the continent’s democratic institutions. When Trump first came to power in 2016, Europe had passed the peak of its first wave of nationalist populism, fuelled by economic and migration crises in the 2010s. Then Trump’s election galvanised European unity and democracy, with German chancellor Angela Merkel depicted as the leader of the free world. Those days are gone. Europe today is on its second, arguably much larger, nationalist-populist wave, as evidenced by national elections across several countries in the past couple of years and the European election in June.
A win for Harris, with her emphasis on freedom, the separation of powers and civil rights, would strengthen liberal democrats in Europe and could even tip the European nationalist-populist wave into stagnation or decline. It would certainly make it harder for nationalist governments, not just in Hungary, but also in Slovakia, Italy, the Netherlands and perhaps Austria, to plough on with illiberal reforms on issues such as LGBTQ+ rights, abortion, asylum, media freedoms and the independence of the judiciary. Liberal democrats in Europe would be galvanised to fight back, probably supported by Harris’s administration.
Trump’s election, however, would have the exact opposite effect, accelerating the “Orbánisation” of Europe and emboldening far-right leaders, parties and governments across the continent. Little wonder then that Europeans are feeling so anxious. Not only is our economy and security in grave danger, but our future existence as liberal democracies hangs in the balance.
Nathalie Tocci is a Guardian Europe columnist
