On 31 July, Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, was assassinated in what is believed to have been an Israeli operation. Haniyeh died in a facility in north Tehran, not long after he attended the inauguration of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. How exactly Haniyeh was killed remains unclear. Israeli sources claim it was done using a bomb that had been smuggled into a bedroom in the facility ahead of Haniyeh’s visit. The bomb was then remotely detonated. Iranian sources insist that he was killed by a rocket fired into the building from a nearby hillside. Whatever the method, the assassination was yet another humiliating intelligence failure for Iran.
For the second time this year, the region is on the brink of a major war as Iran considers its response to a major Israeli provocation. In the view of Iranian analysts, such provocations are “traps” set by the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who wants to drag Iran into a wider war – especially as pressure mounts for a ceasefire in Gaza. Netanyahu, who is increasingly unpopular, is unlikely to remain prime minister in the aftermath of a ceasefire. For years, he has exaggerated the threat posed by Iran, and particularly its nuclear programme, to fuel his political ascendence. Now he is seeking war with Iran to avert his personal downfall.
Iran has avoided this trap once before. On 1 April, an Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus killed several senior Iranian military commanders. Iran’s response to the attack, which came on 13 April, was unprecedented. A barrage of drones and ballistic missiles were launched from Iranian territory towards Israel. The US military helped coordinate Israel’s defence, which, combined with the telegraphed nature of the Iranian assault, served to limit its damage.
Iran’s calibrated response did not restore deterrence – Netanyahu remained sufficiently emboldened to target Haniyeh in Tehran just a few months later. But it did reveal the limits of the “ironclad” US security guarantee. The US was unwilling to support Israel’s counterstrike – President Biden promised a “diplomatic response” to Iran. When Israel did strike back on 19 April, it did so unilaterally, targeting a single military facility. A wider war had been averted.
But now, with Haniyeh dead, Iran is again being urged by its neighbours and western countries to exercise restraint. In recent days, the acting Iranian foreign minister, Ali Bagheri Kani, has welcomed Jordan’s foreign minister in Tehran, attended a special meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Jeddah, and fielded phone calls from numerous diplomats, including the Swiss and Omani foreign ministers, who frequently share messages with Iran on behalf of the US.
The flurry of diplomacy may have delayed the Iranian response, but now Iran appears poised to retaliate. On Sunday the US defence secretary, Lloyd J Austin, told Yoav Gallant, his Israeli counterpart, that the US was moving a second carrier strike group into the region, along with a guided missile submarine.
Early on 12 August, the leaders of the UK, France and Germany issued a joint statement urging “Iran and its allies to refrain from attacks that would further escalate regional tensions and jeopardise the opportunity to agree a ceasefire and the release of hostages”. The statement was spurred by a joint effort from the US, Egypt, and Qatar to head off a wider war. The three countries have invited Israel and Hamas to a summit on 15 August, aiming for a ceasefire agreement and a hostage deal.
The effort to head off an Iranian attack by progressing ceasefire negotiations reflects an important point of consensus among western, Arab, and Iranian leaders. Just as President Biden reportedly believes that Netanyahu may be seeking to drag the US into a wider war against Iran, Iranian leaders understand that Netanyahu has laid a trap for them. Polling suggests that most Israelis believe that Netanyahu must resign when the conflict ends. War with Iran offers him a way to recast himself as Israel’s righteous defender in the eyes of the Israeli public and the international community.
Unable to ignore US pressure, Israel has announced that it will send negotiators to the summit. But Hamas, whose political bureau is now led by military leader Yahya Sinwar, is refusing to attend. This may be a ploy for leverage – Sinwar reportedly wants a deal. Iran could press Hamas to join the summit. But it would also be in Iran’s interest to delay Hamas’s participation until its retaliatory attack has taken place. Tehran will not want to launch an attack while the ceasefire talks are going on, given the risk of derailing the negotiations. Iran will also want the talks to begin shortly after its attack, to ensure that the US constrains Israel’s response to avert derailment of those talks.
Iranian officials say their “priority is to establish a lasting ceasefire in Gaza”, and they would support “any agreement accepted by Hamas”. But they also insist that Iran’s right to self-defence will not be beholden to the ceasefire talks. This is a necessary argument as Iran sets the stage for its attack, which should be calibrated to allow the belated ceasefire summit to proceed shortly thereafter.
But ultimately, Iranian officials must recognise that a ceasefire in Gaza will make Iran more secure. A deal would alleviate the suffering of hundreds of thousands of civilians, restore the security of Iran’s Arab neighbours, reduce tensions with the US, and, possibly, lead to the deposing of Netanyahu. A ceasefire is how Iran avoids the trap.
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj is the founder of the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, a thinktank focused on economic policymaking in the Middle East and Central Asia
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