From Iowa Safe Schools v. Reynolds, decided today by Eighth Circuit Judge Ralph Erickson, joined by Judges Lavenski Smith and Jonathan Kobes:
Iowa Code § 279.78(3) provides: "If a student enrolled in a school district requests an accommodation that is intended to affirm the student's gender identity from a licensed practitioner employed by the school district, including a request that the licensed practitioner address the student using a name or pronoun that is different than the name or pronoun assigned to the student in the school district's registration forms or records, the licensed practitioner shall report the student's request to the administrator employed by the school district, and the administrator shall report the student's request to the student's parent or guardian." …
The district court found part of the statute was unambiguous and another part unconstitutionally vague. The court found the notice provision is unambiguously triggered if a student requests use of a pronoun different than the pronoun assigned to the student in the school district's registration forms or records.
In contrast, the district court concluded that the provision "accommodation that is intended to affirm the student's gender identity" is impermissibly vague because the term "accommodation" has a broad meaning and, without being defined, can lead to unpredictable interpretations and create a substantial risk of arbitrary enforcement. The district court found neither Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary nor other resources helpful in determining the meaning of "accommodation." The court concluded "accommodation" is a "capacious concept" and severed what it found to be an unconstitutional portion of the statute.
{[Bu t]he examples provided by the district court in an effort to demonstrate overbreadth—such as a female asking to sit with boys at lunch, or a male choosing a pink pencil, or a male choosing to write reports about female historical figures—are not on their face student requests to change or modify gender identity.}
