The fall of the Assad regime constitutes a major blow to Russia’s foreign policy and prestige. Not least among the setbacks is the prospect of possibly having to swallow the loss of its only overseas naval base, located in the port of Tartus on Syria’s Mediterranean coast.
The fate of the base is not yet sealed. There can be little doubt that the Kremlin’s top diplomats will be working hard with the new rulers of Damascus to secure their only replenishment and repair station in the Mediterranean.
Yet, the departure of all Russian warships from the base last week indicates that the Russian navy has been overtaken by events. At this stage, the likely outcome is that Moscow’s long-term access to this base will be at least compromised.
Since Peter the Great created the regular imperial Russian navy in 1696, Moscow’s diplomacy and military forces have persistently striven for access to “warm waters”. Indeed, Russia’s access to the global sea lanes of communication passes through enclosed seas (namely the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Sea of Japan) – which do not afford Russian ships unimpeded access to the world’s oceans – or hostile natural environments (such as the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea) where conditions tend to make navigation perilous.
For helping the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war that started in 2011, one of Moscow’s most prized rewards had been access to a naval facility at Tartus.
Since 2013, Assad provided the Russian navy with a safe place for its medium-sized warships operating in the Mediterranean. Its primary purpose is to service and replenish Russia’s naval assets, allowing them to operate in the region for longer periods of time.
Although often overlooked, the task force has used Tartus as a base from which to conduct naval exercises and deployments to shadow Nato forces in the Mediterranean. The purpose of this, in the context of the global geopolitical tensions, has been to contest (or at least test) western dominance of the Mediterranean.
Wider geopolitical consequences
If Russia permanently loses Tartus, it would have several consequences for Moscow. Most importantly its permanent naval task force in the Mediterranean would be forced to either start a long – and frankly humiliating – journey back to Russian bases, or find another temporary base in the region.
After Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ankara closed the Turkish Straits to Russian warships in application of the Montreux convention. This means that any vessels operating in the Mediterranean are unable to journey back to Russian bases at Sevastopol or Novorossiysk in the Black Sea via the Bosphorus.
In the longer term, Russia’s presence in the Mediterranean and, by extension, the Middle East would be diminished. Naval forces play a key role for power and force projection. Indeed, western global military dominance rests on western countries being able to deploy military forces all over the globe for extended periods of time.
This usually involves prepositioning forces such as large carrier battle groups. It’s a domain in which Russia has traditionally lagged behind Nato and the west. This has tended to hamper Russia’s ability to deploy its military power globally.
Logistics is key here. Russia’s loss of Tartus – combined with the enduring closure of the Turkish Straits to its warships as long as the war in Ukraine continues – would seriously damage Moscow’s ability to deploy naval task forces and support operations on land in the region and beyond.
What’s more, the role of naval forces is also to protect the global sea lanes of communication and one’s own merchant marine. With western sanctions restricting commercial shipping operations to and from Russia, Moscow is increasingly dependent on its fleet of Russian-flagged ships to maintain its supply chain. In this context, any limit put on Russian naval power might affect the security of its civilian sector and commercial operations.
Russia’s inability to rescue its client in Syria will have deep consequences for Moscow’s diplomacy in Africa, Asia and South America, where it will be unable to operate with the same ease.
But apart from all this, it is important to recognise that – symbolically – the threat of a loss of a naval facility hits at Russia’s global credibility. This had already taken a hit with the many setbacks Russia has suffered to its Black Sea fleet.
The loss of Tartus certainly won’t force Russia to stop its war in Ukraine. Moscow has demonstrated resilience to strategic setbacks in the past. But it is a serious blow to Moscow’s image as a great power. And this is something that the Kremlin can ill afford ahead of a second Trump presidency.
Basil Germond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
