On the face of it, Russia’s sheepish yet televised announcement that it will abandon Kherson city and points west of the Dnipro represents a remarkable victory for Ukraine and a sophisticated military strategy. If the withdrawal does indeed lead to the swift recapture of the city, the Ukrainians will have done so with relatively little loss of life and without what could have been costly urban warfare.
From the moment the Russian advance was stopped south of Mykolaiv in the spring, the invaders’ position on the west bank was obviously strategically vulnerable. But it has taken a careful three-month campaign to force the Kremlin to conclude it cannot hang on. This began with the targeting of Russian logistics on both sides of the river with Himars and other longer-range rocket artillery, then turned to targeting strategic bridges, and then the pontoons that the Russians had built to resupply their forces in the cross-river pocket.
An immediate question is whether Ukraine will now encounter unexpected resistance as it tries to push south, but with the reconnaissance drone technology it has available it should be able to detect if there are any substantial remaining forces. Serious battles appear unlikely – although Ukrainian troops will have to be wary of mines left by the retreating invaders. Russia has been preparing its exit for a month now, moving command and control across the river and at least some of its experienced forces, before finally evacuating any sympathetic citizens and the bones of Catherine the Great’s chief minister Grigory Potemkin.
Ukraine will want to disrupt the Russian retreat as much as possible, capturing soldiers and, above all, equipment. This would turn the withdrawal into something like the near-rout that took place in September, when Russia made a similar decision: to withdraw from near Kharkiv and Izium to behind the Oskill river, in an attempt, only partially successful, to consolidate its position into the late autumn and early winter.
Of critical importance will be for Ukraine to secure the Nova Kakhovka dam, upstream from Kherson. Russian officials and military bloggers still repeat the implausible threat that Ukraine intends to destroy the 30-metre-high dam, a hydroelectric facility that Kyiv warns has been mined by the Russians. Russia could gain most from destroying the dam, although it would probably be a war crime, further affecting Ukraine’s already battered energy supplies, and widening the vast river at what is currently a relatively narrow point – although it could come at the cost of disrupting Crimea’s water supply.
Russia’s strategy is clearly to try to consolidate its territorial gains as it seeks to bring more of the 300,000 conscripts forward to stabilise the frontlines, and turn the barrier of the Dnipro in its favour. That, though, is likely to turn attention to other parts of the frontline, such as the front south-east of Zaporizhzhia, which has been stable for months. The attraction for the Ukrainians is that attacking here could cut off the land bridge to Crimea.
For now, though, Russia remains in control of a large swathe of contiguous occupied territory. But what Ukraine has consistently shown all throughout the autumn is that its military are able to respond flexibly and creatively as the war continues – think also of the recent daring drone raid on Sevastopol naval base. It was an approach signalled by the Ukrainian presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak in August, where he said Kyiv’s ambition was to create “chaos within Russian forces” by striking at Russia’s supply lines as the attack on Kherson was only gearing up.
Now, Ukraine’s apparent victory could not be more timely as Americans and Europeans worry about high energy costs ultimately caused by the war. The challenge for Kyiv will be to repeat it against Russians who are desperately trying to dig in.
