Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), scored a total victory at the 20th Party Congress in mid-October. He not only secured an unprecedented, though widely expected, third five-year term, but he also managed to fill the Politburo and its Standing Committee with loyalists. In a display of raw political power, he forced into retirement two of his leading rivals, Premier Li Keqiang and Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Yang, though both were under the informal retirement age of 68. A younger rising star, Hu Chunhua, an incumbent Politburo member and a protégé of former party chief Hu Jintao, was unceremoniously dumped from the body at the very last minute.
However, far from guaranteeing another decade of success as China’s dominant leader, Xi’s triumph is likely to usher in a period of political rivalry among his own loyalists who are eager to seek his favor and gain an edge in the inevitable struggle for succession. Nor will Xi’s political dominance guarantee the success of policies urgently needed to meet the needs of the population and Sino-U.S. strategic competition. Xi has amassed coercive power that may make him all but invulnerable inside the regime, but this power is of limited use when seeking to reinvigorate economic growth, promote technological self-sufficiency, and address the looming demographic catastrophe.
