From yesterday's N.Y. appellate division decision in People v. Herrnkind:
On November 5, 2001, the defendant and her codefendant, her husband, abused and killed their three-year-old daughter. In 2004, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment of 25 years, to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision….
In 2022, the defendant moved … to vacate her sentence and to be resentenced under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) in accordance with Penal Law § 60.12, to seal the record of the motion, and to make the caption anonymous…. [The trial court] denied the motion without a hearing, determining, inter alia, that the defendant failed to submit evidence within the definition of the DVSJA corroborating that she was subject to abuse at the time of the offense or that the abuse was substantial. The defendant appeals.
It is undisputed that during the course of this appeal, the defendant was released from custody and thereafter discharged from parole. Accordingly, her contentions regarding her entitlement to resentencing under the DVSJA have been rendered academic, as she has already served the challenged sentence.
Civil Rights Law § 50-b provides that the "identity of any victim of a sex offense" shall be confidential…. Here, the defendant failed to establish that she was the victim of a sex offense as defined by Civil Rights Law § 50-b.
In addition, she failed to demonstrate compelling circumstances to seal the record of the motion, as the majority of the information contained therein was already made public during the defendant's criminal trial….
"In determining whether to grant a [party's] request to proceed anonymously, the court must use its discretion in balancing [that party's] privacy interest against the presumption in favor of open trials and against any potential prejudice to [their opponent]" "Among the factors the court should consider are 1) whether the [party] is challenging governmental activity or an individual's actions, 2) whether the [party's] action requires disclosure of information of the utmost intimacy, 3) whether identification would put the [party] [or innocent third-parties] at risk of suffering physical or mental injury, 4) whether the [opponent] would be prejudiced by allowing the [party] to proceed anonymously, and 5) the public interest in guaranteeing open access to proceedings without denying litigants access to the justice system."
Here, in support of her motion {to make the caption anonymous}, the defendant submitted an attorney affirmation that made only a brief statement that the defendant might suffer further mental harm if her identity was revealed, which was insufficient to support the relief requested….
