Donald Trump’s expected foreign policy towards Europe during his second term will have far-reaching, and possibly, grave consequences.
At the end of last week, journalist Nicholas Vincour suggested that the decades-long close Europe-American relationship was about to be over, whoever won the White House. And that Europeans should worry less about the presidency and “more about how Europe can hack it alone on a dangerous global stage”. Yesterday’s dismissible cynicism over declining American commitment in Europe is today’s cautionary tale. But with Trump as president that concern deepens considerably, particularly over trade and defence.
In his first presidency Trump unleashed a battery of tariffs, tit for tats and trade wars with states, companies and regions including the EU. That trend is set to continue, if Trump’s campaign promises are to be believed, including imposing 10-20% tariffs on all imports, with a particular focus on key states such as Germany and key companies including Mercedes-Benz.
Trump’s stated preference is to reset the supply chains to US advantage, either through eye-wateringly high tariffs or ensuring greater post-manufacture assembly of foreign goods in the US. These are high stakes indeed. The US is the EU’s biggest trade partner, with ever-increasing volumes of goods and services being purchased.
Is Europe prepared?
Not only has the European Commission been sharpening its teeth on a number of trade, tech, AI and investment-related mechanisms designed to keep Trump-upmanship at bay. But the highly anticipated trade war has already been prepared for, at least in terms of protecting the EU’s financial interests.
The European Commission is focused on increasing the EU’s overall self-sufficiency in big tech, including climate tech and raw materials. This will likely invite arguments with the US, as well as unresolved arguments over steel.
Trump’s antipathy to Europe isn’t new. And it isn’t entirely personal. Washington is no longer populated with policy makers with a natural empathy to, or even personal connections with, Europe. Even under presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden, Washington shifted clearly, and possibly permanently, away from both Europe and Nato and towards Asia
Whether via reduced troop levels or diminished diplomatic interest in Europe among officials in the State Department, US attitudes to Europe range from indifferent at best, to hostile at worst.
The US has moved from post-cold war levels of cooperation in 1994 to pivot towards Asia in the 2000s. Now, accelerated by entrenched partisanship, isolationism and Trump’s second win, Washington remains content with the ongoing “downgrading of Europe in the psyche of American elites”.
This despite (as argued by retired US Army officer and former commanding general Ben Hodges) critically reducing the “huge advantage we [the US] have with our leadership inside NATO and our relationship with European countries”. As president, Trump is simply going to accelerate this trend.
In the Baltics
Among Baltic countries there is already an expectation that Trump will push European states for higher defence spending. However, in the eyes of some, Trump’s demand is not a bad thing in and of itself.
As Tallinn-based International Center for Defense and Security director Indrek Kannik argues: “If the US spends 3.5 to 4 percent on security, while Europe only spends 1.5 to 2 percent, it’s an imbalance.”
Kannick’s suggestion that “Europe will gradually assume more responsibility for its defense” echoes perspectives increasingly advocated in Brussels itself. In effect: now is the time for Europe to acknowledge finally its lacklustre, scattered approach to defence coordination.
Others fear that Trump 2.0 “would be so hostile to Europe … that the bloc would have no choice but to bolster its defense spending”.
For the Baltics, the question of improving defence coordination and sorting out financing is vital in tackling the threat of a territory-hungry Putin on its borders.
Wake up, Nato?
Last time around, Trump was fiercely critical of Nato, largely because the US provides the largest portion of defence spending. Trump’s view in 2016 was that this encouraged free-riding among other members, happy to contribute less at the US’s expense.
This time, Trump has ramped up his criticism that Nato allies are still failing to spend enough. This in turn has spurred Trump to suggest that he would “encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to Nato allies who fail to pay their bill.
This leaves open the question of whether the US itself would defend another member in the event of an attack, or even leave the organisation.
Trump’s options regarding Ukraine are simple: either arm it, or deny it aid. The former risks freezing battle lines and forcing an imperfect peace on Ukraine, the latter gives Russia’s President Vladimir Putin a satisfactory victory, bringing an aggressive Russia to the very doorstep of the EU and Nato.
This is particularly worrying for Baltic states: with Ukraine overpowered, the eastern flank of the EU and Nato would be exposed, which in turn would destabilise European collective security.
From a foreign policy perspective, the frustration is that European decision makers simply cannot be sure of what Trump will actually do next. As journalist Janan Ganesh recently observed, the US “at its peak had more going for it than overwhelming strength. It had a certain amount of predictability. Without either, its purchase on events can’t be the same”.
Friends in some places
Trump’s victory will be warmly welcomed by some Europeans, particularly those from far-right parties who will now be confident in a White House that shares their ideological approaches. Similarly, Trump may even lend active support to far-right governments in Hungary and Italy.
There are opportunities aplenty. Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán has spent years personally cultivating a deep connection with Trump and Maga-Republicans. And Italy’s prime minister Giorgia Meloni could continue the same balancing act she has within the EU on key issues including immigration.
Others, like the UK and the European Commission, are going to have to play either the pragmatist card, or be prepared to hit back, and hit hard against everything from isolationist tariffs to vanishing defence commitments.
Amelia Hadfield is the Founder of the Centre for Britain and Europe which has received Erasmus+ funding from the European Commission.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
