Donald Trump has all but clinched the Republican presidential nomination, kicking off a US general election campaign between two elderly one-term presidents, each of whom is profoundly unpopular in their own way. Perhaps more unusually for the US, however, it also kicks off an election in which the foreign policy stakes are far higher than usual, and one in which the two presidential rivals offer radically different visions of the US’s role in the world.
Political scientists have long known that American voters do not typically vote on foreign policy issues, which pale in comparison with economic or social issues. In 2024, however, that rule is not likely to hold. A plethora of recent polls suggest that Americans are increasingly concerned about foreign policy; one survey found that four in 10 voters rank the issue among their top concerns.
This may all be less surprising than it at first appears. With two major wars overseas and growing perceptions of a threat from China, foreign policy seems more urgent in 2024 than it has in years. But the trend is also bolstered by the fact that politicians are increasingly framing questions of domestic industrial policy, energy policy and even immigration as foreign policy or national security issues.
And, unlike many previous contests, there is a sharp dichotomy between the two parties. Joe Biden seems determined to stake his presidency on foreign policy issues; his speeches in recent months have sought to tie his stewardship of the war in Ukraine – and support for Israel’s war in Gaza – to the survival of democracy here at home in America. His October Oval Office speech argued that: “American leadership is what holds the world together.” Whether or not this is wise, Biden clearly views his own legacy as primarily that of a foreign policy president – and views democracy around the world as the pivotal issue of our times.
Trump, meanwhile, has always espoused a harder-edged nationalist worldview, one that flies in the face of Biden’s vision of America as the world’s police officer. Earlier this month, he told supporters he wouldn’t protect Nato member states that didn’t meet the alliance’s defence spending targets – and indeed would, perhaps, welcome a Russian attack on Europe.
The overall picture is likely to be one of clashing grand narratives: Trump’s America First nationalism versus Biden’s global pro-democracy crusade. Both sides will be described with smears: Trump will undoubtedly argue that Biden is a globalist who puts foreign countries’ needs above the interests of American voters, whether factory workers in Ohio or US soldiers stationed in the Middle East. Biden, on the other hand, will argue that Trump is an isolationist who doesn’t understand the US’s vital role as the indispensable nation, promoting global peace and stability.
One suspects that this battle – combined with ongoing chaos in world affairs – is not likely to favour Biden. US voters are increasingly sceptical about the idea that America is the world’s indispensable nation; and young voters in particular are dubious about the Biden administration’s commitment to human rights and appalled by his support for Israel’s war in Gaza. Biden’s other problem, of course, is that it is easier to criticise than to fix complex international problems.
Where Biden may be able to make inroads is in reminding voters of how mercurial and chaotic Trump’s first presidency was. After all, Trump was in love with Kim Jong-un – who sent him the sweetest letters – long before he turned against “little rocket man”. Trump made no secret of his attempts to woo Xi Jinping before turning to trade war against China. And he was against intervention in Syria, for it, and then against it once again. A second Trump presidency would no doubt include much of the same volatility, protestations from his supporters that better staffing can resolve this problem notwithstanding.
But we can make some predictions about a second Trump presidency with a reasonable amount of confidence. In practice, he will probably take a significantly harder line on China, including new tariffs and trade restrictions. Prominent conservatives likely to hold roles in his administration – such as former deputy assistant secretary of defence Elbridge Colby – are notable China hawks, and Trump’s animus towards free trade is well known. He will almost certainly deprioritise Europe in favour of Asia. His congressional allies, already sceptical of Ukraine aid, are unlikely to approve significant further spending or arms to Kyiv.
Perhaps the biggest potential foreign policy danger lies on the US’s southern border, where the growing influx of migrants from around the world claiming asylum is increasingly perceived by many Americans to be a threat. Trump has promised to treat this as a national security issue, pledging to deploy troops to the border, and potentially even engaging in military action against cartels in Mexico or elsewhere. This is a potential disaster. The US’s 20-year, festering insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan were bad enough; a similar campaign on its southern border could be much worse.
Then there are elements of a second Trump administration that might look surprisingly consistent; the Biden administration has already maintained a remarkable number of Trump policies, from the China tariff wars to the embrace of Saudi-Israel normalisation. Yet elections are as much about narrative as anything else, and Trump will benefit throughout 2024 from the ability to criticise Biden’s foreign policy record and present his own vision of a slimmed-down America First approach. Indeed, polling suggests that this could have significant appeal for voters: a majority of Americans think it is time to push for a negotiated settlement in Ukraine, while a plurality believe that the US should either downsize or withdraw troops completely from Europe and want the US to play a major, but not leading, role globally.
At the end of the day, it remains impossible to accurately predict anything when it comes to Trump; his conduct in office never bore a strong resemblance to his rhetoric. But as the commotion over the US’s commitments to Nato shows, foreign policy is likely to be a significant issue throughout this year’s presidential campaign, and one that – perhaps counterintuitively – plays to Trump’s strengths. After 20 years of democracy promotion and Middle Eastern wars – and four years that have seen so much upheaval and crisis in international affairs – can the Biden campaign really be sure that Trump’s vision of a US that looks after its own interests first will not resonate with voters? That’s a risky bet.
Emma Ashford is a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy programme at the Stimson Center, Washington DC, and the author of Oil, the State and War
