In recent months, Vladimir Putin and his proxies have been foreshadowing a change in Russia’s nuclear doctrine. This is the set of rules that spells out when and how his country might resort to the use of its nuclear arsenal, which is currently the largest in the world. Most recently his deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, said the revisions to the rulebook were “connected with the escalation course of our western adversaries”. In other words: it’s not us, it’s you.
You don’t have to read too much between the lines to discern a connection between the growing clamour by some in the west to allow Ukraine to use western long-range missiles against targets deep inside Russia and Russia’s decision to reconsider under what circumstances it would use its nuclear arsenal.
Over the past couple of years – since shortly after he initiated Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – Putin and his inner circle have regularly invoked Russia’s nuclear deterrent, writes Christoph Bluth, an expert in nuclear proliferation and international security at the University of Bradford. All it seems to take is for the west to agree another large package of funding, or change the terms of its aid to Kyiv for the Kremlin to dust off the doomsday scenario.
