Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan comes to the Group of 20 summit in Bali this week with an unexpected boost from the role he’s played securing global grain supplies during Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Erdogan’s burgeoning reputation as a power broker wasn’t a given when Russia invaded Ukraine in February, threatening the delicate balancing act the Turkish leader has kept up between Moscow, Ukraine and his own NATO allies since at least 2016.
The Turkish leader faced criticism at previous international meetings for domestic and foreign policies seen by some G-20 leaders as excessively repressive or disruptive. He heads into the Nov. 15-16 G-20 summit while dealing with the aftermath of a bomb blast in Istanbul on Sunday that killed at least six people and wounded 81, with officials saying they suspect a terror attack.
Yet as he arrives in Bali, Erdogan appears increasingly confident of his place at the table. He’s more sought after for his continued ties to Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, and more sure of re-election in a vote scheduled for next year, as his offshore exploits help put a floor under previously waning domestic support.
Erdogan succeeded — against many predictions — in helping to navigate a July deal to permit Ukrainian grain exports by sea and, as a result, counter runaway global food price inflation. More recently, he helped persuade Putin to rejoin the agreement just days after the Russian president suspended his country’s participation.
“Leave that with me, I will first tell it to Biden,” Erdogan said, when asked by Turkish journalists how he convinced Putin to reverse course, referring to the U.S. president. In September, Erdogan also helped mediate a high profile exchange of 270 prisoners between Russia and Ukraine.
Turkey’s leader hopes to meet with Joe Biden on the sidelines of the G-20, and the grain corridor — which expires Nov. 19 — would likely to be a prominent topic, Erdogan’s spokesman Ibrahim Kalin told CNN-Turk television in early November. Kalin went on to boast that his boss was in demand from foreign leaders looking for a way to reach Putin.
“If everyone burns bridges with Russia,” Kalin said, “who will the Russians talk to, who will talk to the Russians?”
Erdogan was among several leaders whom US National Security Council Adviser Jake Sullivan said Biden might meet one-on-one in Bali. Sullivan spoke to reporters aboard Air Force One on Saturday. State Department spokesman Ned Price said recently the U.S. was “deeply appreciative of the efforts of our Turkish allies” on the grain deal.
In Indonesia, according to three people familiar with the matter, Erdogan will look for greater recognition as the president of a regional power that plays a growing role from Ukraine to Syria and Libya, where Turkey has troops or advisers on the ground. Indonesia as G-20 host is also pushing for a broadening of the Ukraine grain agreement to include fertilizer, according to another official familiar with the discussions, and Turkey would play a role in that.
The war has shown that “Putin needs Erdogan, as much as Erdogan needs Putin,” said Soli Ozel, a foreign policy specialist and lecturer at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University. “He was in a very delicate situation and managed it rather well.”
Erdogan’s influence is nevertheless limited. Turkey has repeatedly sought without success to mediate peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow, on occasion trumpeting progress that proved illusory.
Turkish influence is constrained by its own interests and economic dependencies on Russia, according to Nigar Goksel, Turkey project director at the International Crisis Group.
“Moscow also has leverage over Turkey in other conflict zones such as Syria and the South Caucasus, as well as a vested interest in driving a wedge between Turkey and its NATO allies,” said Goksel.
None of this is likely to make Erdogan suddenly popular in Washington or many European capitals, which have criticized his crushing of opponents and democratic institutions at home. Erdogan sees his influence as asserting independence for Turkey, in a form that continues to grate with allies.
Turkey has delayed accession to NATO by Finland and Sweden, over the latter’s ties to Kurdish groups. It continues to defy the U.S. over its purchase of a Russian air defense system seen as a threat to NATO aircraft. And more recently, Erdogan expressed an interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, set up by Russia and China as a rival to NATO, which names both countries as security threats.
Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion had appeared at first to threaten the relationship Erdogan so painstakingly nurtured with Putin in recent years, secured among other things by the purchase of that advanced Russian S-400 system.
Erdogan condemned Russia’s war, sold additional armed drones to Kyiv and closed access to the Black Sea and Turkish airspace to the Russian Navy and Air Force.
Yet he also avoided choosing sides, putting at risk the growing ties with Ukraine he had built on military cooperation – in particular Ukraine’s supply of engines for Turkey’s well-regarded Bayraktar TB2 armed drones.
Turkey declined to join the U.S. and Europe in imposing sanctions on Moscow and has seen exports to Russia soar as a result. Turkish airlines added flights to Russia, as other international airlines withdrew. That has made Turkey an important escape valve for Russian trade and travelers.
At the same time, Turkey appears to have avoided helping Russia evade sanctions, even if the Biden administration has concerns, according to a person in Washington familiar with the matter.
So far, Erdogan’s two-handed approach seems to have worked. The provision of Bayraktar drones appears to have inoculated Turkey from any backlash in Kyiv. Putin, meanwhile, has lavished praise on Erdogan, calling him “a strong, firm leader who is guided by the interests of Turkey, the Turkish people, and the Turkish economy,” during the Kremlin’s annual Valdai conference in Sochi in late October.
That kind of language resonates well for Erdogan at home, at a time his unorthodox economic policies have helped stoke inflation to 86% and weaken the Turkish currency, hammering living standards.
Erdogan also signed an agreement in August with Putin to boost economic ties. Russia is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, with a second project recently agreed.
The Turkish president is seeking price discounts and increased volumes of Russian natural gas imports, ensuring that Turks can heat their homes this winter, as parts of Europe face potential shortages and even rationing, according to the people familiar with the matter. That, too, could prove a vote winner.
Erdogan has welcomed Putin’s proposal to turn his country into a regional hub for natural gas, by constructing a new transit route for Russian gas flows to Europe. The project is unlikely to materialize, because even if European buyers supported it, the cost of the project’s Turkish section alone would be up to $30 billion. But like Erdogan’s diplomacy, the idea plays well domestically.
The Turkish leader could end up with both an energy and food hub for exports across the Black Sea, with Russia guaranteeing safe passage for shipments directly to Turkey to distribute onward, an official familiar with Moscow’s thinking said.
Any domestic boost Erdogan receives from his war-time dealings with Ukraine and Russia would be well-timed. After winning re-election in 2018 with 53% of the vote, enough to avoid a runoff, Erdogan’s approval fell below 40% this year.
“It’s pretty clear,” said Ozel, the foreign policy analyst, “that Putin would prefer to see Erdogan re-elected.”
—With assistance from Jennifer Jacobs, Justin Sink and Josh Wingrove.
