For more than two weeks, missiles and drones have been crossing the skies of the Gulf, as a war many in the region sought to avoid – between the USand Israel, and Iran – continues to escalate. Airlines are diverting flights, shipping routes are being disrupted and air defence systems across the region are operating at constant alert. Now, with attacks extending to energy infrastructure including gas facilities and production sites, it is likely that the war has entered into a dangerous phase of escalation.
Yet the governments now living with these risks were among those that most tried to prevent the conflict, encouraging negotiations in recent months and warning about the dangers of escalation.
For governments in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha and elsewhere, this moment is particularly unsettling because it is disrupting a strategy they have spent decades trying to build. Gulf states have sought to shield themselves from the region’s cycles of conflict through a mix of economic diversification, diplomatic engagement and carefully managed security partnerships. That strategy rested on three pillars: reliance on US security guarantees, cautious outreach to Iran and expanding economic ties with Israel. The war is revealing the fragile foundations of all three.
The effective closure of the strait of Hormuz has disrupted one of the world’s most critical energy and shipping corridors, sending insurance costs soaring and forcing commercial vessels to halt or reroute traffic across the region. Port activity across the Gulf has slowed sharply, including at major logistics hubs such as Jebel Ali in Dubai, as shipping companies delay or suspend calls and global supply chains adjust to mounting risk. Airlines are diverting flights to avoid missile and drone activity across Gulf airspace, disrupting the operations of major global transit hubs in Dubai and Doha that serve as critical gateways linking Europe, Asia and Africa.
These developments carry particular significance at a moment when Gulf governments are attempting to transform their economic models. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects, the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a global aviation and logistics hub, and the region’s broader push into tourism, finance and technology all depend on one essential factor: stability. War threatens precisely the reputation these states have spent years trying to cultivate.
At the same time, the crisis is exposing the limits of the Gulf’s longstanding reliance on the United States as its ultimate security guarantor. For decades, the US military presence in the region has been the cornerstone of Gulf defence strategy. US airbases dot the region and Washington remains the primary supplier of advanced weapons systems. Yet the current confrontation also reveals the asymmetry built into that arrangement. When Washington escalates tensions with Iran or backs Israeli military operations, it does so according to its own strategic calculations. The Gulf states, by contrast, are left to manage the consequences that are now affecting their cities, citizens, economies and infrastructure.
In response to these vulnerabilities, Gulf governments have spent recent years trying to diversify their diplomatic relationships. The Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 reflected a broader regional effort to reduce tensions and avoid direct confrontation. The UAE reopened diplomatic channels with Tehran, while Qatar and Oman continued to maintain dialogue with Iranian officials.
These initiatives reflected a pragmatic recognition that stability in the Gulf ultimately requires some form of coexistence with Iran. Yet the current war is demonstrating the limits of that strategy. Even when Gulf states seek to lower tensions with Tehran, they cannot insulate themselves from escalating confrontation between Iran and Israel or the US.
In recent years, several Gulf states expanded ties with Israel, most visibly through the Abraham accords, which promised economic cooperation and technological exchange. But the political context of the current war is making open alignment with Israeli military objectives increasingly difficult.
This new war is unfolding alongside the devastation of Gaza and the continued erosion of Palestinian political prospects in the West Bank. These developments are profoundly shaping regional public opinion and placing clear limits on how closely Gulf governments navigate dynamics with Israel. Any offensive military posture would probably be perceived domestically as support for Israel.
Further escalation by attacks on energy infrastructure now carries serious and immediate risks for the Gulf. While they are deeply concerned about the costs of continued war, they are equally wary of its outcome. They know that a significantly weakened Islamic Republic would not produce the stability that they need, and that over time Iran could become more fragmented and unstable. Leaving the Islamic Republic to control the strait of Hormuz is also an untenable outcome. At the same time, allowing the war to run its course could entrench a longer, more volatile conflict environment in which Gulf states remain exposed to both Iranian retaliation and the broader consequences of regional instability.
Despite years of diplomatic diversification and strategic hedging, Gulf leaders find themselves confronting a familiar reality where the region remains vulnerable to conflicts and threats shaped elsewhere. Many officials already see the current confrontation as the fourth major war in the Gulf since the 1980s, after the Iran-Iraq war, the 1991 Gulf war and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Yet unlike those earlier conflicts, the current confrontation involves multiple theatres, powerful regional actors and a network of non-state forces.
The crisis may nevertheless carry an important lesson. It strengthens the case for deeper Gulf defence integration. Coordinated air-defence networks between the states, shared early-warning systems and closer maritime security cooperation could help reduce vulnerabilities.
But military coordination alone cannot provide lasting stability. The region’s security challenges remain tied to unresolved conflicts that continue to drive cycles of escalation across the Middle East from Yemen to Gaza, Lebanon and now Iran.
For Gulf states, the immediate priority is to contain escalation and avoid further strikes on energy and infrastructure. But the more consequential challenge lies in shaping the endgame. Neither a prolonged war nor a significantly weakened Iran offers a path to stability. Both scenarios risk producing a more fragmented and unpredictable regional order, with continued threats to Gulf security. This requires sustained and proactive diplomatic engagement aimed not only at limiting escalation, but shaping its trajectory to avoid a prolonged and more dangerous regional order.
Sanam Vakil is the director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House
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