There’s an understandable inclination at first blush to see the US presidential election outcome as auguring difficult times ahead on the global stage. President-elect Donald Trump’s iconoclastic rhetoric on Ukraine, Gaza, Taiwan, tariffs and more in the lead-up to the election, coupled with his transactional approach to business, alliances and international institutions, and of making America great again, appear to be zero-sum propositions for which the world is bracing for impact.
Australia is a bit of an outlier on this on a range of fronts. Public statements have invariably emphasised shared values but it is enduring overlapping interests that will feature more prominently now.
Economically, Australian stocks are high. The biggest direct foreign investor in Australia is the US – by a country mile. The US retains a considerable trade surplus with Australia, which can be expected to act as a buffer for Trump’s tariff instincts. Thanks in part to the multitrillion-dollar super funds portfolio, the US is a significant beneficiary of Australian funds investments.
Security-wise, the collaboration is far more profound than most would appreciate. Dating back multiple generations, to the dark days of the second world war, if not to the shared crucible of war in 1918 in France, deep, trusted and trusting collaboration has led to the relationship going far beyond the Anzus pact of 1951. That 800 plus-word essay did not include a mutual defence clause, a headquarters, a commander or assigned forces. Today, though, the bilateral Australian-US defence ties are surprisingly broad and deep, across the land, air, sea, logistics, space, cyber and intelligence domains.
They are most tangibly evident in the joint defence facility at Pine Gap, which is a top-secret base operated and crewed 50% by Australians. Successive governments, when briefed on what it offers to Australia, have become its ardent defenders, largely because of the insights on the world it offers Australian government decision-makers. That’s not going away anytime soon.
Indeed, the intelligence ties are a super-enabler for Australia, not just in a hard military sense but in terms of access to advanced technology that enables the work of policing intelligence, financial intelligence and more.
Critics of Aukus are easy to find, and already the sense is that this scheme may have left Australia unduly exposed. Yet indicators to date suggest that, while delays and costs may blow out, the US remains committed to ensuring nuclear propulsion submarines are available and operate from and around Australian waters – initially with US navy boats and eventually with Australian-owned ones as well. Viable alternatives are not easy to find. Indeed, the submarine base at Fremantle is becoming a more consequential “suitable piece of real estate”, equivalent in significance to Pine Gap.
Pursuing alternative options to Aukus pillar one (nuclear-propulsion submarines) is effectively no longer viable as they would probably cost a great deal in terms of opportunity cost and more. We can realistically expect the current and future federal governments, of either persuasion, to follow through on this scheme, capitalising on the considerable investment made in legislative and administrative reform designed to allow greater technology sharing with Australia.
Trump insiders have consistently indicated that, in terms of the art of the deal, Aukus remains mutually beneficial. What Trump himself thinks, admittedly, has yet to be discerned and, no doubt will be a critical determinant for the future bilateral trajectory. If he changes course, Australia’s predicament will be considerably more acute.
The prospect of Australia’s defence being dependent on a presidential whim points to the need for Australia to muscle up on its own, including with as much US-sourced technology as can be accessed, without waiting for another white knight or great white fleet to come to the rescue.
Aukus pillar two is already starting to deliver benefits to Australia and the US, with licensed hi-tech production and manufacture options in the pipeline. The momentum is growing and has been broadly and enthusiastically welcomed by Trump insiders.
Critics may decry the turn in US domestic politics arising from the Trump administration. There are a number of aspects which the Australian government likely will wrestle with, particularly regarding initiatives linked to climate change, as well as diversity, equity and inclusion. Australians concerned by such moves might consider that Australia has sought closer relations with a number of neighbours with domestic and international policies which are not particularly well received in Australia. But that has not stopped such climate and DEI initiatives from being progressed.
Now, perhaps, the US will be less seen as a political city on a hill, as much as it ever was. The rhetoric of shared values is likely to be toned down and the rhetoric of enduring overlapping interests will now come to the fore. If US soft power wanes, the implications will be widely and deeply felt.
In 2017, shortly after the last time Trump came to office, the Australian government issued a foreign policy white paper – what I call Australia’s foreign policy plan B. It’s time to re-read that and think further about how we deepen and strengthen the assortment of other regional security and economic ties, to offset the prospects of an unpredictable US government adding to security and stability difficulties in Australia’s neighbourhood.
• John Blaxland is professor of international security and intelligence studies at the ANU’s strategic and defence studies centre
