I was talking to Prof. Lorianne Updike Schulzke (who teaches at Northern Illinois and is visiting this semester at Yale), and she brought up some interesting thoughts on the President's supposed inherent constitutional power to dismiss independent agency officials. She was kind enough to pass along this quick summary; I'm not an expert on the field myself, but I thought it was worth passing along in turn:
Serious Originalists should pause before solidifying President Trump's control over independent agencies by overturning Humphrey's Executor. Yesterday the DC Circuit stayed the reinstatement of Gwynne A. Wilcox of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), potentially under the theory that Seila Law throws Humphrey's Executor into doubt.
Yet as I demonstrate in a paper just out in the Connecticut Law Review, Un-fathering the Constitution, the historical grounding of Seila Law in Madison's vision of executive removal is tenuous at best. In fact, more careful historical analysis demonstrates that Madison's vision should not dominate executive removal.
Further, this history shows that the original Congress anticipated a role for itself in limiting the president's removal power. If this history is to have any sway (and Originalism dictates that it should), Humphrey's Executor should be kept intact and greater power over independent agencies should not be granted to the Trump administration.
Congress began creating independent agencies in the 1880s, when they established the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate railroads. Since then, the President has made top appointments for such agencies, and Congress lower appointments according to Article II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. Under Humphrey's Executor, the appointees who run these agencies have a quasi-legislative role (being set up by Congress), and therefore the president's ability to control and fire them is limited.
