It is almost three years since Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin declared a friendship with “no limits” – weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, they have retreated from such rhetorical enthusiasm. The “no limits” language was quickly dumped, probably at Beijing’s behest. When Mr Putin visited in May last year, he claimed that he and his counterpart were “as close as brothers”. Mr Xi more coolly called the Russian president “a good friend and a good neighbour”. China has conspicuously not reciprocated Mr Putin’s description of it as an ally.
Yet the partnership continues to broaden and deepen, to western alarm, across economic, political and military fronts. The US Council on Foreign Relations recently assessed it “the greatest threat to vital US national interests in sixty years”. The last 12 months saw unprecedented joint military activity by Chinese and Russian forces – though the aim was probably to signal their combined might rather than pursue the interoperability that is foundational to the US-European alliance. In September, the US suggested for the first time that Beijing might be supplying direct support for the Russian war machine in Ukraine, beyond the kind of dual-use equipment it has been shipping and the essential role it plays as an export market for Russian oil. A flurry of books on the “new cold war” appeared in 2024.
