The Consumer Finance Protection Bureau was structured to give its director independence from the executive branch and Congress. The CFPB Director served a fixed-term, and could only be removed by the President for proper cause. And the CFPB did not have to ask Congress for appropriations. Rather, the Director could request funds from the Federal Reserve that he deemed "reasonably necessary." And if the agency has a budget surplus, it could maintain and even invest those funds. From its inception, the CFPB was a separation of powers abomination.
Yet, despite the best efforts of regulated parties, the CFPB has survived to this day. Seila Law v. CFPB (2020) found the for-cause protection to be unconstitutional, but saved the agency by making the director removable at will. However, CFPB v. CFSAA (2024) upheld the funding scheme. As a result, Congress has not actually appropriated a penny for the CFPB. This sort of independence made sense when the director sought to maximize the agency's effectiveness. But this independence will have a very different effect with a director who seeks to defenestrate the agency.
Ross Vought, the acting director of the CFPB, announced that the agency will take no further money from the Federal Reserve.
