From the unsigned majority opinion today in National Park Serv. v. National Trust for Historic Preservation:
In October 2025, the federal government started a project to replace the East Wing of the White House. The first phase involved the demolition of the existing East Wing, something the government completed in December 2025. The next phase, currently ongoing, involves the construction of a new East Wing, including a below-ground military installation and an above-ground ballroom.
The National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States (Trust) filed a lawsuit in federal district court challenging various aspects of the project…. On March 31, 2026, the district court granted the Trust's motion [to halt ongoing construction] and issued a preliminary injunction … [that] enjoined any further construction above ground, except as "strictly necessary" to protect the White House, the President, and his staff…. On August 7, 2026, the court of appeals … upheld the district court's injunction….
Confronted with an imminent order requiring it to substantially halt its ongoing construction activities, the government filed a motion in this Court seeking a stay of the district court's injunction pending a forthcoming petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings in this Court….
Beginning with the merits, the government is likely to prevail in showing that the Trust lacks standing to challenge the East Wing project…. To establish its standing to bring this case, the Trust relies on a declaration from a single [one] of its members, Alison K. Hoagland. Hoagland says that she lives in Washington, D. C., and expects to visit the neighborhood around the White House "about once a month." She asserts that having to view the finished ballroom the government is constructing would cause her to suffer "injuries" to her "aesthetic, cultural, and historical interests" because she finds the "scale," "height," and "massing" of the government's design distasteful. On the strength of that declaration, the Trust contends, it has Article III standing to challenge the East Wing project.
This Court has not found standing in circumstances like these before. To the contrary, we have repeatedly held that mere offense, disagreement, or distaste does not qualify as a concrete and particularized injury under Article III. As we have put it, "this Court has long made clear that distress at or disagreement with the activities of others is not a basis under Article III for a plaintiff to bring a federal lawsuit." Instead, to secure standing a plaintiff must identify some concrete and particularized injury "other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees."
Nor is it clear what would remain of Article III's concrete-and-particularized injury requirement if we were to extend our case law in the manner the Trust now suggests. Perhaps nearly any government action or project offends someone's sensibilities. And adopting the Trust's "unprecedented and limitless" view that offense alone suffices to establish a concrete and particularized injury would seemingly usher in a world where "virtually every citizen had standing to challenge virtually every government action that they do not like—an approach to standing that this Court has consistently rejected as flatly inconsistent with Article III." Alliance, 602 U. S., at 391–392. Absent some considerable revision to our existing standing doctrine, then, the government is likely to succeed on the merits.
To be sure, and as the Trust observes, we have found standing in certain environmental cases where the plaintiff 's injuries involved more than mere offense. So, for example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. (2000), we found standing where the plaintiffs alleged that "harmful pollutants" the defendant discharged into a river forced them to abandon "fish[ing], camp[ing], swim[ming], and picnic[king] in and near the river" as they had in the past. And in Summers v. Earth Island Institute (2009), we noted the government's concession that one member of the plaintiff organization previously had standing to sue for injuries to his "recreational interests" in a national forest before ultimately denying standing because a partial settlement left no member with a concrete and imminent injury. None of this, however, helps the Trust because none of it unseats this Court's long-held view that Article III standing is unavailable where, as here, the only injury a plaintiff asserts stems from offense, disagreement, or distaste.
Separately, the Trust points to Lujan's statement that the "desire to … observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes," can constitute "a cognizable interest for purpose of standing." And the Trust reasons that, if the desire to view a "particular crocodile" qualifies as a cognizable interest for purposes of Article III standing, Hoagland's desire to view a new East Wing characterized by more "stately simplicity" than the government proposes must as well. But none of this helps the Trust either. Proceeding to reject the plaintiffs' claim to standing, Lujan stressed that a cognizable interest is a necessary component of standing but not a sufficient one: Article III "requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest." Among other things, a plaintiff must also show that its claimed injury is "concrete and particularized." And, again, as our precedents have repeatedly held, a plaintiff 's "distress at or disagreement with" a defendant's actions does not clear that bar.
Finally, the Trust replies that, even if this rule routinely applies in cases brought by ordinary citizens and taxpayers, it should not apply in this case. It should not, the Trust argues, because Hoagland is "not just any person," but someone who possesses "focused and substantiated" expertise in historic architecture. Our standing rules, however, contain no such special carveout. Article III standing, we have consistently held, "is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest," or by a litigant's "special interest in the subject." …
The government has also established that it will likely suffer irreparable harm from the district court's injunction and that the balance of the equities tips in its favor.
Start with this. The district court likely exceeded its Article III authority to enjoin the activities of a coordinate branch of government. Cf. Trump v. CASA, Inc. (2025). And courts may not exceed the bounds of their lawful authority simply because they may think another branch has exceeded its own.
Nor is that all. The government has also presented declarations from the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the United States Secret Service, and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of the Army, among others, attesting to national security and other harms that would likely arise from enjoining a "single, coherent" project that cannot be readily cleaved into distinct below- and above-ground pieces. The Secretary of the Army, for example, represents that "[t]he height and mass" of the planned above-ground ballroom are "crucial" to shield the planned underground military installation "from kinetic impacts," and that, without such height and mass, "engineers would need to dig impractically deep."
Of course, the district court's injunction does not completely preclude above-ground construction and might be read to afford the government sufficient leeway to revise its construction plans and install some form of protective cover over the below-ground military installation. But none of that calls into question the government's declarations attesting that constructing something approximating the height and mass of the intended above-ground ballroom is "crucial" to the security of the below-ground military installation; that every day during which construction is delayed impairs the Secret Service's "protective operations"; that the contemplated ballroom would enhance security for Presidents and their visitors who in the past have had to meet in soft tents or offsite when gathering in large numbers; that a prolonged construction period increases the risk of foreign actors "gathering intelligence on" the project; or that freezing construction would risk significant "construction-related problems" ranging from concerns about how to secure the structural integrity of a partially completed superstructure to the possibility of having to delay the installation of infrastructure "required to make below-ground facilities operational."
Meanwhile, on the other side of the ledger and against these harms, the only harm the Trust claims is the offense one of its members will suffer from having to view a structure of the "scale," "height," and "massing" the government intends. These harms and equities are not nearly in equipoise….
Today, we do not pass upon the legality of the government's East Wing project. We conclude only that, based on the submissions before us, the government is likely to prevail in showing that the Trust lacks Article III standing to challenge the project in federal court and that the remaining stay factors favor relief. Accordingly, the application for stay presented to The Chief Justice and by him referred to the Court is granted….
