The Supreme Court on March 21 adjourned the hearing of a review plea against letting off Punjab Congress leader Navjot Singh Sidhu with a fine of ₹1000 in a 34-year-old road rage case to March 25.
Justice A. M. Khanwilkar, the lead judge on the Special Bench which also comprises Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, informed the lawyers that the case would be listed again on Friday.
Apex court directive
The previous hearing of the case had spelt trouble for Mr. Sidhu, who was asked by the court to respond to a plea made by the family of the victim that the facts of the case show he was responsible for a far more grievous crime like culpable homicide or even murder.
Gurnam Singh died in the road rage incident in 1988. The Punjab and Haryana High Court had found Mr. Sidhu guilty of committing culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In appeal, the apex court set aside the High Court verdict. The top court held him guilty of the lesser offence of causing voluntary hurt to Singh, saying such roadside brawls were a “very common sight in this country”. He was let off with a fine of ₹ 1000 in May 2018.
Singh’s family filed for a review of the judgment the same year. The court issued a formal notice to Mr. Sidhu, specifically on the quantum of sentence, in September 2018.
Family’s recent plea
The family, represented by senior advocate Siddharth Luthra, recently filed an application asking the court to enlarge the scope of its examination. Mr. Luthra argued that “if hurt has caused death of the victim, the offence is culpable homicide”.
Referring to past apex court judgments, he stated that “when there is death of a human being, it may either be culpable homicide [amounting or not amounting to murder]... Offences affecting life are distinct from the offence of hurt. If hurt results in death, intended or unintended, the offence would fall within the category of an offence affecting life”.
Mr. Luthra contended that the May 2018 judgment of the apex court, letting Mr. Sidhu off with a fine of ₹ 1000, demonstrated “error apparent on the face of the record”. He urged the court to not restrict its scope of examination to just the quantum of sentence but to the matter as a whole.
