If a restaurant customer finds a bone in an order of "boneless wings" can they sue? What if the bone causes them an injury?
Today, in Berkheimer v. REKM L.L.C., the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a lower court judgment concluding that a customer could not sue a restaurant for negligence over an injury allegedly sustained by a chicken bone found in an order of "boneless wings."
Here is how Justice Deters opens his opinion for the four-justice majority:
Michael Berkheimer sued a restaurant, its food supplier, and a chicken farm after he suffered serious medical problems resulting from getting a chicken bone lodged in his throat while he was eating a "boneless wing" served by the restaurant. The trial court determined that as a matter of law, the defendants were not negligent in serving or supplying the boneless wing, and the Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
Berkheimer contends that the court of appeals focused on the wrong question—whether the bone that injured him was natural to the boneless wing—in incorrectly determining that the restaurant did not breach a duty of care in serving him the boneless wing. Berkheimer maintains that the relevant question is whether he could have reasonably expected to find a bone in a boneless wing. And he argues that the resolution of that question should be left to a jury.
We conclude that the court of appeals got it right. In a negligence case involving an injurious substance in food, it is true—as Berkheimer argues—that whether there was a breach of a duty of care by a supplier of the food depends on whether the consumer could have reasonably expected the presence of the injurious substance in the food and thus could have guarded against it. But that consideration is informed by whether the injurious substance is foreign to or natural to the food. The court of appeals correctly applied this blended analysis in determining that there was no material question of fact about whether Berkheimer could have reasonably expected a bone to be in the boneless wing and thus could have guarded against it. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Twelfth District.
And from the part of the opinion discussing what one should expect from an order of "boneless wings":
Berkheimer protests that the court of appeals did not give due consideration to the fact that the food item was advertised as a "boneless wing" and that there was no warning given that a bone might be in the boneless wing. Regarding the latter argument, a supplier of food is not its insurer. And regarding the food item's being called a "boneless wing," it is common sense that that label was merely a description of the cooking style. A diner reading "boneless wings" on a menu would no more believe that the restaurant was warranting the absence of bones in the items than believe that the items were made from chicken wings, just as a person eating "chicken fingers" would know that he had not been served fingers. The food item's label on the menu described a cooking style; it was not a guarantee.
The dissent wonders what would happen in cases involving food that was advertised as lactose-free or gluten-free. Obviously, such cases are not before us. But unlike the presence of the bone in this case, the presence of lactose or gluten in a food that was advertised as lactose-free or gluten-free is not something a consumer would customarily expect and be able to guard against.
Justice Donnelly wrote the three-justice dissent. It begins:
The result in this case is another nail in the coffin of the American jury system. The majority has taken it upon itself to decide the facts of this case and has determined that there is no set of facts under which appellant, Michael Berkheimer, the plaintiff in the underlying negligence action, can establish the defendants' negligence. Today, the majority declares as a matter of law that no reasonable person could consider the facts of this case and reach a conclusion contrary to the one it reaches. This is, of course, patently untrue given that I and two other justices of this court dissent from the majority's judgment.
And from the portion of the dissent on what "boneless" means with regard to "boneless wings":
The absurdity of this result is accentuated by some of the majority's explanation for it, which reads like a Lewis Carroll piece of fiction. The majority opinion states that "it is common sense that [the label 'boneless wing'] was merely a description of the cooking style." Majority opinion at ¶ 23. Jabberwocky. There is, of course, no authority for this assertion, because no sensible person has ever written such a thing. The majority opinion also states that "[a] diner reading 'boneless wings' on a menu would no more believe that the restaurant was warranting the absence of bones in the items than believe that the items were made from chicken wings, just as a person eating 'chicken fingers' would know that he had not been served fingers." Id. at ¶ 23. More utter jabberwocky. Still, you have to give the majority its due; it realizes that boneless wings are not actually wings and that chicken fingers are not actually fingers.
The majority's burst of common sense was short-lived, however, because its opinion also says that no person would conclude that a restaurant's use of the word "boneless" on a menu was the equivalent of the restaurant's "warranting the absence of bones." Id. Actually, that is exactly what people think. It is, not surprisingly, also what dictionaries say. "Boneless" means "without a bone." . . .
The question must be asked: Does anyone really believe that the parents in this country who feed their young children boneless wings or chicken tenders or chicken nuggets or chicken fingers expect bones to be in the chicken? Of course they don't. When they read the word "boneless," they think that it means "without bones," as do all sensible people. That is among the reasons why they feed such items to young children. The reasonable expectation that a person has when someone sells or serves him or her boneless chicken wings is that the chicken does not have bones in it. . . . Instead of applying the reasonable expectation test to a simple word—"boneless"—that needs no explanation, the majority has chosen to squint at that word until the majority's "sense of the colloquial use of language is sufficiently dulled," In re Ohio Edison Co., 2019-Ohio-2401, ¶ 67 (DeWine, J., concurring), concluding instead that "boneless" means "you should expect bones."
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