The Biden administration has crossed a new line in its support for Ukraine, by indicating its willingness to send Patriot air and missile defence systems to aid in the war against Russia. The system – which includes powerful missile interceptors and radar – is likely to prove highly effective for Ukraine, and marks a significant step forward in the scope and complexity of the US’s support. But the gift of such prestige systems will present longer-term challenges for Nato.
Joe Biden previously ruled out sending Patriot systems to Ukraine. The shift in policy appears to have arisen from Russia’s extensive targeting of Ukraine’s civilian critical national infrastructure, which has left much of the country without power. Russia is now seeking to obtain Iranian ballistic missiles to bolster its own depleted stocks, and this, combined with ongoing domestic missile production, means these attacks may persist for a long time. Defending Ukraine from missile attacks is now a humanitarian priority.
The Patriot is one of the world’s most capable air and missile defence systems. Over the past five years Saudi Arabia has shot down hundreds of Iranian-designed missiles fired by the Houthis using the system. Beyond protecting Ukraine’s cities, the provision of such medium-range air defences may also free up some capacity for Ukraine’s S-300 missile systems, expanding the available air cover over the frontlines.
It is important to note that the system will not provide immediate protection, and so Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure are likely to continue in the short term. Patriot is a complex system to both operate and maintain. Previously provided equipment – without requisite training on how to maintain and repair it in combat conditions – has suffered from maintenance issues. Ensuring that the Ukrainians can operate the system sustainably will take time.
As Ukraine’s stocks of air defence missiles have fallen, the country has become increasingly dependent on international support, just as it now relies on its partners for the majority of its artillery ammunition and armoured vehicles. That reliance comes with some risks, especially for systems for which Ukraine’s partners have limited stocks.
Some fear that giving certain military support to Ukraine risks wider escalation, but this was not the basis for US reluctance to send Patriot systems. The US has significantly fewer of them than its own operational analysis suggests are necessary to defend its forces in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, there is continuing demand for missiles from existing users, from Sweden to Saudi Arabia: the latter expends a significant number of missiles each month in defence of its critical national infrastructure. Missile manufacturing levels, meanwhile, are low.
In some respects this problem of supply reflects the wider challenge in munitions supplies to Ukraine. Ukrainian armed forces’ consumption of ammunition significantly exceeds the available supply, and their artillery is wearing out barrels faster than they can be replaced. The hollowing out of Nato’s defence industries has left the alliance in poor shape to support sustained high-intensity operations. In the case of systems such as Patriot, the challenge is greater because it takes much longer to manufacture precision weapons such as air defence missiles than it does to make unguided artillery rounds.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should prompt the regeneration of Nato’s industrial base – investing in munitions factories and critical machine tooling – but this will take time. In the interval before increased supply is available, and with the current pressure on demand, there is also a risk that by providing key systems to Ukraine, the west does so at the expense of its deterrence posture towards China over its threats to Taiwan’s independence.
Facing such competing pressures, the US and other Ukrainian partners have had to carefully balance the support they provide Ukraine between those systems its military can be trained to operate, that which Nato’s defence industry can sustain, and the donors’ own security needs. In this context, while Patriot offers a good option for defeating cruise and ballistic missiles targeting Ukrainian cities, it is important that local air defence officers understand that they cannot expend an endless supply of these munitions and that they prioritise them accordingly.
Patriot is certainly capable of downing Iranian-made Shahed-136s, munitions that have also been used to hit energy infrastructure. But if it is used in this role Kyiv will run out of missiles fast. This has already happened with GMLRS, the long-range rocket provided to Ukraine. Although its forces were initially careful to use GMRLS against high-priority targets it has increasingly been employed more widely, contributing to operational success in the liberation of Kherson, but significantly exceeding the rate of consumption of these missiles supportable by Ukraine’s partners.
The provision of Patriot – like other systems before it – is not a magic bullet. It offers Ukraine defence against a specific threat. But fielding at scale an affordable and sustainable means of defeating the other threats to Ukraine’s energy security will require some innovative thinking and investment by Ukraine’s partners. It is also vital for global stability that the provision of these systems is matched by an ability to industrially replenish Nato stocks – and to convince China that production can be sustained in the event of a larger conflict.
Jack Watling is a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute
