When it comes to conflict and insurgency in the far South, way too much attention is placed on the negotiating table.
For much of the past 19 years since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in this historically contested region where the vast majority of locals identify as Malay, peace efforts have come and gone, with none gaining meaningful traction. The current process too is resting on thin ice that has yet to crack.
People see Malaysia's new prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, and the new facilitator as a breath of fresh air. But essentially, this is Thailand's problem, and the solution must come from the Thai state.
In the past, a change in the government in Bangkok came with a new negotiation team. Today, the National Security Council (NSC) has firmly established itself as the main driver for the peace process. The Peace Dialogue Panel, the official name for the Thai negotiating team, is expected to continue after a new administration comes to power.
But political stability alone is not enough. Nothing comes easy in Thailand's southernmost region where generation after generation of Malay Muslims opted for arms struggle against the Thai state as part of a commitment to liberate their homeland from the "invading" Siamese/Thai.
Thailand never made a serious effort to understand the power of the Patani Malays' historical and cultural narrative. Thai leaders often dismiss those who took up arms as radicalised Muslims who embraced distorted history and practiced the wrong Islam. By blaming the Malays for the problem, officials believe they don't have to examine the failure in their own policy and strategy.
Unlike the previous wave of insurgency in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the theatre of the current violent wave has shifted from remote mountains and hilltops to towns and cities where soft targets are not spared.
Local activists worked hard to bring some degree of civility to the conflict, often criticising Barisan Revolusi Nasional for deliberately targeting civilians. BRN was told that the rules of engagement must be respected and revenge killings or attacking soft targets to get even with Thai security forces are never justified.
While humanitarian principles and norms have significantly improved over time, this conflict has turned many live upside down. Buddhist weddings no longer run through the night as guests need to return home before it's too dark. Young Melayu men leave home to seek employment elsewhere in Thailand and Malaysia to avoid relentless harassment from security officials.
While the fabric of society among older folks -- 50 years old and above -- is still intact, the conflict has taken its toll on the younger generation of Buddhists and Muslims who grew up witnessing their neighbours caught up in the crossfire and become what security experts referred to as "collateral damage".
As representatives from the two warring sides spend their time negotiating over the text of the various topics on the negotiation table, what has been overlooked is the input and feelings of the local people.
The five-day visit of the newly appointed Malaysian Facilitator, Gen Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, to the Patani region was welcomed by local residents who were hoping that engagement from the key stakeholders -- including the BRN, whose chief negotiator phoned in through an online platform -- could be a game changer as it places them in the centre of discussion.
Buddhist civil society leaders made a strong showing, challenging Thai authorities at times over what they perceived to be a state monopoly over who has the right to set the agenda at the negotiating table.
One of the three topics on the negotiating table is Public Consultation (PC) where the three stakeholders (Thailand, BRN and Malaysia) consult with locals about their concerns.
To do it effectively, it is a foregone conclusion that residents must be assured that they can speak freely. Sadly, this isn't the case today. People don't feel they can talk freely about their true feelings, regardless of how trivial it may seem to outsiders.
For now, the three sides can't agree if each group should conduct their PC individually or collectively. Perhaps Thailand, the BRN and Malaysia should ask themselves what they aim to achieve from the public consultation. If the aim is to formulate their respective strategy, perhaps they should consider conducting PC individually. At the least it could help ensure anonymity and put the participants a little more at ease.
Gen Zulkifli, a retired Malaysian Army chief, has been meeting all sorts of people, including people behind the back channel, who he called "spoilers", to better understand the challenges at hand better.
The Thai government and military, on the other hand, appeared to be somewhat nervous about his presence, not quite sure what to make of it. The fanfare was seemingly just too much for them to handle. Regardless of the excitement, in the final analysis, the solution to the Patani problem rests with Thailand.
In the back of the minds of Thai officials is the government's 20-year plan. After all, this will be one of the benchmarks their superiors will judge them by.
Thailand's General Election is just around the corner. Foreigners who don't quite understand Thai national politics often asked if a new government would make the peace process smoother.
So far, no political party is making a conflict resolution plan for the Patani region as part of their political platform. This is a sad reality, and it reflects poorly on Thailand's political leaders. But then again, putting a political spin on conflict resolution for the far South is not exactly a piece of cake for anybody.
One positive development in Patani is that a growing number of young Muslim Malays -- people who support the right to self-determination for people in the region -- believe taking up arms is not the way.
Some have joined local administrative organisations to bring about change in their community. Others are joining civil society organisations, believing working for change through non-military means is more effective when done collectively and consistently.
But the willingness to bring about change through non-military means hasn't put the government security apparatus at ease. Military hardliners have openly stated that they are concerned with the growing number of young Malay Muslims entering local and national politics. They don't want them to enter politics and yet they don't want to see them taking up arms either. Apparently, the Thai government is torn, and that self-contradictory perceptions will undermine any effort to bring peace to the deep South.
Asmadee Bueheng is a Pattani-based writer and researcher who focuses on the conflict in Thailand's far South.
