[For the last month, I've been serializing my 2003 Harvard Law Review article, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, and I'm finishing it up this week.]
Following the passage of the Brady Bill by the House of Representatives in 1991, the pro-gun-control movement was jubilant, not only savoring its victory but anticipating more to come. "The stranglehold of the NRA on Congress is now broken," said then-Representative Charles Schumer. "[T]hey had this aura of invincibility … and they were beaten." One newspaper editorialized that "with the post-Brady Bill momentum against guns, we hope fees (including on gun makers) can be increased, and the monitoring of dealers tightened," thus "reduc[ing] the total number of weapons in circulation." Decision A (the Brady Bill) was thus seen as potentially leading to a decision B (further gun controls) that may not have been politically feasible before decision A had been made.
