An extraordinary rally in Warsaw last Sunday drew crowds of up to 800,000 opposition supporters, many waving Polish and EU flags, on to the streets of the capital. The prevailing atmosphere was one of peaceful concern for the fate of the country. As one of the biggest demonstrations in Poland’s recent history, it was a stunning show of support for the opposition Civic Coalition and its leader, former prime minister Donald Tusk, as he prepares to challenge the rightwing populist governing party Law and Justice in elections on 15 October.
But despite the success of the march, and all it symbolised, Poland’s authoritarian trajectory is stronger than it has ever been. For the past eight years, the government of an EU member state has been in the grip of unremitting populism. Ever more institutional elements of the liberal democratic system have been stripped away, while independent media have been targeted and minority rights significantly weakened.
Instead of being a democratic contest – the moment in the cycle when the people get to demand accountability – this election campaign has been yet another expression of illiberalism. The opposition’s warnings about the threat to democracy have been ridiculed or dismissed. Neutralising political scandals has become an art form. The entire apparatus of the state, taken over by Law and Justice, has been used to tip the scales in the party’s favour. We are well on the road to hi-tech authoritarianism, with pro-government propaganda pouring out of every social media platform.
Violence has also overshadowed the campaign. Not since 1989 has there been a more brutal pre-election period. More than 64% of people surveyed describe this campaign as more violent than previous ones, and 58% believe that the ruling party is responsible for this deterioration. Opposition MPs have been arrested and attacked physically or verbally in public. Ordinary citizens have been beaten in the streets for wearing opposition symbols. Brutal trolling campaigns have been waged on the internet, often participated in by politicians, including ministers.
Obviously, confrontation and denunciation are part of political rough and tumble in other European countries. The difference here is that, one by one, red lines are being crossed in this campaign and dehumanising the opposing side is taken as a given. Crucially, the populists no longer condemn the violence inflicted on their political opponents. The peaceful march in the centre of Warsaw was therefore an exception to this “new normal”.
An added dimension comes from the war in Ukraine. Neighbouring countries are deeply affected by the war, and the belligerence has become, directly and indirectly, a part of everyday experience. Fear of the conflict spilling over the border drove an initial wave of Polish solidarity with Ukrainian refugees. The countries of this region have been wiped off the map on numerous occasions, so their attitude to sovereignty is one of post-trauma.
For that reason, Poles were eager to welcome Ukrainian refugees into their own homes; they recognised themselves as potential future victims of Russia. “We will be next” became a catchphrase in response to the invasion and a call for solidarity with Ukraine. History has long divided Poland and Ukraine, but in the post-Soviet era reconciliation has prevailed, thanks in part to a shared fear of Russia but also such events as the Euro 2012 football tournament, jointly hosted by the two nations, and Polish support for the Euromaidan movement the following year.
Yet 18 months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war raging on the other side of Poland’s eastern border has become normalised. This is a paradox of Ukraine’s extraordinary military resilience: its counteroffensive may be currently stalled, but Russia’s advance has been stopped, at least for the time being. But as fear of Moscow as an imminent threat has ebbed and war fatigue has spread among the Polish public as well as in government circles, solidarity has also flagged. Populism in power has returned to its reliable “natural” trajectory of pure Poland-centrism.
This is the new geopolitical context in which Law and Justice – one of the loudest champions of western military aid for Kyiv in the initial phase of the war – could have reached the point of saying it would cease Polish weapons support for Ukraine as part of a dispute over Ukrainian grain imports depressing prices for Polish farmers. In a tight election, the ruling party is desperately chasing every nationalist vote. Low-priced Ukrainian grain was controversial among farmers everywhere in the region. Yet the tone of this dispute between Warsaw and Kyiv would have been unthinkable only months previously. In autumn 2023, the fear of losing power is apparently stronger for Poland’s ruling party than the fear of Russia.
With the heart of global diplomacy now in Kyiv and a transatlantic alliance formed around it, the nationalist government in Warsaw finds it hard to remain an uncritical ally. The two countries look more like rivals for the role of regional leader than close allies. As one of the largest member states of the EU and a Nato member, Poland’s importance is clear, but the balance of power would immediately shift if Ukraine were to be admitted to either organisation.
If Polish populism has now returned to its old ways, what is at stake for Europe in this election? For a start, a Law and Justice party win would mean that support for EU enlargement to include Ukraine would certainly be tempered. We could also expect a new wave of protectionism, sovereigntism and uncompromising approaches towards neighbouring countries.
The internal problems of Poland are now European, if not global. And besides the weakening of international solidarity, the illiberal Pandora’s box contains many other nasty surprises. Insulting the European Union, Brussels or Germany has been a feature of this campaign, and Warsaw would be an even more truculent partner within the EU after winning the election. Poland under populist rule will not work for a collective European agenda, but – together with Hungary under Viktor Orbán, Slovakia under Robert Fico and others – for the primacy of the nation state. The illiberal trajectory almost always leads to national egoism and international confrontation.
The huge opposition rally last Sunday at least offers one last hope when the other monstrous creatures have left Pandora’s box. Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition has only a slim chance of winning. But the demonstration showed there is a strong need among people who oppose this populist government to gather together, to share an atmosphere free of rancour, division and aggression. The coming weeks will tell us how much of this hope can survive in the years to come.
Karolina Wigura is a historian, board member of the Kultura Liberalna Foundation in Warsaw and a senior fellow at Zentrum Liberale Moderne (LibMod) in Berlin
Jarosław Kuisz is a political analyst and editor-in-chief of the Polish weekly Kultura Liberalna. He is the author of The New Politics of Poland: A Case of Post-Traumatic Sovereignty
Their book Posttraumatische Souveränität (Post-Traumatic Sovereignty) is out this month
