I'm serializing my forthcoming Emory Law Journal article titled Addiction to Constitutionally Protected Activity: Speech, Press, and Religion. In my first two posts, I argued that calls to regulate social media platforms and video games on the theory that they are "addictive" could equally plausibly be made with regard to various religious practices, which seem to share some of the supposedly "addictive" properties—yet of course the Free Exercise Clause would preclude such regulation, at least as to adults. Here's where I also apply that to attempts aimed at shielding children from supposedly addictive religious practices; in coming posts, I'll talk about how this reasoning also applies to attempts aimed at shielding adults and children from supposedly "addictive" speech products:
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So far, we have been speaking of the religious freedom rights of adults, and of religious organizations that deal with adults. But the Free Exercise Clause would also likely impose serious constraints on attempts, aimed at preventing "addiction of minors," to restrict religious organizations' conduct and speech.
