When it was announced that Michel Barnier was France’s new prime minister, commentators joked that he was better known to the British public than to the French. There’s more than a grain of truth in this.
The name of the former chief EU Brexit negotiator would raise a nod of recognition in many British households (for good or ill). In France, Barnier was a peripheral right-wing politician.
His appointment has nothing to do with Brexit and everything to do with the state of French politics since president Emmanuel Macron’s bewildering decision in June to dissolve the National Assembly and call parliamentary elections.
A member of the rightwing Les Républicains, Barnier’s 50-year political career has seen him serve in both national an regional parliaments, at times concurrently.
Barnier was always Gaullist, meaning that he believes in a strong French nation, but he has also always been pro-European. This was not an easy line to tread in a party whose relationship with Europe was complicated.
Much of Barnier’s career in parliament saw him engaging in European affairs, meaning he had the perfect profile to take on the role of EU commissioner for regional affairs from 1999 to 2004. At the end of that term, Barnier was brought back in as foreign minister but his time in office was brief.
His later appointment as minister for agriculture and fisheries from 2007 to 2009 might have seemed a bit of a comedown, but it was never in Barnier’s character to lobby hard on his own behalf. The president at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy, also knew that while some regarded Barnier as rather terne (dull) he would quickly master the detail of his brief.
Barnier resigned to become an MEP in 2009 and took a job as an EU commissioner in 2010. He was the obvious choice to head the Brexit team and Barnier gained a great deal of credit among EU member states as a negotiator following the UK’s vote to leave in 2016. He was not only praised for his handling of the British but also in bringing the 27 members along with him.
In 2020, Barnier’s name was among those touted to replace Edouard Philippe as prime minister. Macron instead chose to appoint Jean Castex, an unknown civil servant who had overseen the first COVID-19 lockdown. With Brexit negotiations over, Barnier turned his attention to an unexpected bid to be the Les Républicains candidate for the 2022 presidential election.
He ultimately lost out to Valérie Pécresse, but she then managed only 4.7% in the presidential election. The party fell under the control of Eric Ciotti and its hard-right wing. He responded to the dissolution of the National Assembly by leading a breakaway group of Les Républicains parliamentarians into an electoral alliance with Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally.
Why Barnier now?
Seen from the outside, Barnier’s record hardly seems like a ringing endorsement of the case for him as prime minister. He did, after all, lose his party primary to a woman who went on to secure less than 5% of the national vote in the presidential election. But that is to overlook the internal politics of the French republican right and centre post-dissolution.
Macron needs Les Républicains, but they will not sell their 47 seats cheaply. And why should they? Macron’s gamble in calling an election went catastrophically wrong. It was the left-wing alliance, the New Popular Front (NFP) that emerged with the largest number of seats – nearly 200 – while Macron’s various supporters managed around 180.
Macron, however is not temperamentally equipped to accept cohabitation with the left and had no intention of appointing a government led by the NFP. Focus then shifted onto the centre-left or centre-right options: Bernard Cazeneuve, a former Socialist prime minister, or former right-wing minister Xavier Bertrand.
It may well be that the Cazeneuve option was just Macron’s attempt to split the left bloc. It failed when the Socialist executive committee voted against supporting such an enterprise. But the problem with Bertrand was that he was deeply unpopular within his own party, having left in 2017 before rejoining in 2021.
Barnier, on the other hand, is regarded within Les Républicains as a loyalist and has the full backing of his party in both houses of parliament. More importantly, he has no ambitions to use the premiership as a platform for another tilt at the presidency .
Le Pen, meanwhile, announced that her group would table an automatic motion of no confidence in a government led by either Cazeneuve or Bertrand. When the name of Barnier was mentioned, however, she took a “wait and see” line.
The reasons for this lie in Barnier’s 2021 presidential bid, which saw him tack further right by promising to freeze immigration for up to five years, build more prisons and open up discussions on France’s future relationships with the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice.
It’s still not clear if Barnier can secure any sort of workable platform in the National Assembly or even appoint ministers. It is unlikely that he will have the names of his senior team ready before 16 September and until then, there will be any number of names being linked to the key ministries - interior, finance, education. A notional 234 MPs out of 577 might make up a government bloc, if all the Macronists, Les Républicains and the moderate right group sign up and the far-right sit on their hands.
Le Pen and Ciotti have stated they have no intention of being part of the government or its majority. Part of Le Pen’s appeal is to stay outside of “the system”.
Her lukewarm acceptance carries with it a risk of being seen has condoning the process, but probably will not alienate many of the 10 million electors who voted National Rally in the election. The far-right would vote for legislation they approve of and abstain when they do not.
If Barnier makes a decent go of it, then he will govern through to 2027. Macron might push the dissolution button again in June 2025, or perhaps even resign. Whatever happens, it will not be an easy relationship. Barnier didn’t pull his punches in criticising Macron during the 2021 primary campaign and both sides have said they anticipate a period of “forthright coexistence”.
With the budget yet to be finalised, and France having to explain its national debt problems to the EU later this month, those negotiating skills are already being put to their fullest test.
Paul Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
