Malian officials announced on 4 May 2026 that junta leader General Assimi Goïta would take on the post of defence minister after the killing of General Sadio Camara a week earlier.
Camara’s death occurred amid an offensive by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, which launched attacks across Mali. Insecurity persists in Mali despite years of military rule, which was justified on promises of restoring order and defeating insurgent violence.
On the surface, Goïta’s decision to absorb the defence portfolio appears to be a pragmatic wartime measure, aimed at ensuring continuity within the armed forces during a period of instability.
But the move also follows a broader political path that has become visible in Mali since the junta seized power in 2020. Rather than institutionalising military rule, Goïta has concentrated authority around the presidency, tightened control over the state’s coercive apparatus, and relied on a small circle of military elites.
As political scientists who have extensively published and written on military coups and regime trajectories in west Africa, we observe this behaviour is not unique to Mali. It is the third country in the region to see military leaders consolidate their authority around individual leaders rather than the armed forces.
Across the post-coup Sahel, military regimes have shifted from presenting themselves as temporary “corrective” interventions to becoming personalised systems of rule. The other two examples are Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who took power in Burkina Faso in September 2022, and Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tiani, who seized power in July 2023.
The distinction matters because military regimes governed collectively by officer coalitions retain some internal balance and institutional constraint. As power becomes concentrated around a single ruler, however, decision-making revolves around personal loyalty rather than broader military or state interests.
Military rule and personalisation in Mali
Goïta (then a colonel) and his companions in Mali toppled President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2020. The coup architects initially presented themselves as reluctant interveners. At the time, observers expected a short transition. Within months the regional body Ecowas had lifted its financial embargo.
Goïta pledged elections within 18 months, then 24.
A constitutional revision passed in 2025 removed the provision that had previously barred him from standing in any future presidential election. Political parties were banned. The transitional legislative body was filled by presidential decree. And civilian oversight institutions, including the electoral observation body, were dissolved.
The armed forces were restructured along lines scholars recognise as counterbalancing. This is best described as a coup-proofing mechanism. Regimes create parallel armed structures with distinct reporting lines to make it more difficult for any group to move against them.
In Mali, three specialised military units were created with overlapping counter-terrorism mandates that report to the executive. The police were also placed under military discipline.
Goïta assumed the defence portfolio, appointed the former chief of staff of the armed forces, Major General Oumar Diarra, as delegate minister, and named a new chief of staff to replace him.
The defence portfolio controls the largest share of the state budget, grown from 11.5% to 14.5% of GDP since 2020. It is where Mali’s relationship with Africa Corps, which since 2023 has replaced French forces in counter-terrorism operations, is managed daily.
As defence minister since the coup, Camara had been the primary link with Africa Corps.
The appointment of Diarra is consistent with what scholars describe as the rotation of commanders to limit the accumulation of loyalty around any single figure. Diarra had served as chief of staff since 2020.
Burkina Faso and Niger
In Burkina Faso and Niger, too, there have been signs that military regimes are concentrating power around individual military leaders rather than a collective of officers.
Traoré is perhaps the clearest example of this trend. Since seizing power in 2022, he has cultivated an image of himself as a revolutionary anti-colonial figure, drawing comparisons to the iconic Burkinabè leader Thomas Sankara.
Coordinated social media campaigns glorified Traoré while attacking critics. This was combined with nationalist rhetoric and highly publicised economic reforms. All helped elevate his image as the symbolic saviour of Burkinabè society.
Allegations of assassination attempts and coup conspiracies helped rally public support around Traoré as a besieged national leader. They also served as valuable pretexts for targeting political opponents and rivals in the military.
Traoré has appointed family members and trusted allies to strategic positions. Individuals like his brother, Inoussa Traoré, hold senior positions and help curate the regime’s digital message while maintaining links with sympathetic civil society.
Elections are repeatedly delayed and Burkinabes are urged to “forget about democracy”. Traoré is slated to remain in power until 2029.
In Niger, Tiani, the former commander of Mohamed Bazoum’s Presidential Guard, has extended his rule until at least 2030.
Much like Goïta, he has made the timeline conditional on the state of the country’s security.
Tiani dissolved political parties, promoted himself to army general, a first in Niger, and was cast as a national hero. He has reportedly retreated almost entirely from public life and conducts government from within the presidential guard compound.
From there, Tiani has militarised the civilian administration and placed trusted figures around him. General Salifou Mody at defence serves as his principal relay with Russian partners and with the chief of staff of the armed forces, General Moussa Salaou Barmou.
The regime also moved to repress political opponents through civilian-facing institutions, such as the Commission de lutte contre la délinquance économique, financière et fiscale.
The perils of personalism
For decades, political scientists have highlighted the dangers and weaknesses of personalist political systems. Concentrating power around a single ruler often weakens the institutions needed for effective governance and long-term stability.
In military-ruled countries like those in the Sahel, the consequences can be especially severe. Armed forces may be reorganised less around operational effectiveness than around protecting the ruler from rivals and internal threats.
Promotions and command positions become tied to loyalty, parallel security structures proliferate, and mistrust within the officer corps deepens. On the battlefield, these dynamics can undermine coordination and reduce the military’s ability to respond effectively to insurgent violence.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
