On returning from his recent trip to China, French President Emmanuel Macron gave interviews that have ruffled feathers on both sides of the Atlantic. Memorably, he said that Europe cannot blindly follow the United States’ lead and should avoid “getting dragged into crises that are not our own.” This remark, which presumably refers to Taiwan, has caused some observers to claim that he is undercutting the trans-Atlantic front against China, even though he went on to reiterate France’s support for the status quo in Taiwan.
He expanded in a vein many commentators also found controversial: “Europeans cannot resolve the crisis in Ukraine; how can we credibly say on Taiwan, ‘watch out, if you do something wrong, we will be there?’” But this is hardly surprising: As part of his broader, ongoing pitch for “strategic autonomy,” Macron simply observed that Europeans would not be credible in Asia if they can’t tend to security issues in their own backyard—especially given that successive U.S. presidents, Republicans and Democrats alike, have asked Europeans to take greater ownership of their own security.
Commentators may fret over Macron’s blunt comments, but his remarks reveal the deeper motivations for his trip to China: that the European Union should find its own voice in world affairs and not let its worldview and interests be shaped by others, whether in Washington or Beijing. Though U.S. policymakers may not be ready to hear it, the uncomfortable truth is that Macron is saying out loud what many European partners quietly believe.
Behind closed doors, European leaders genuinely worry about walking in lockstep with Washington into an open conflict with China. Europeans are concerned with many aspects of China’s behavior, from unfair trade practices to human rights abuses. The European Commission has been willing to confront some of these issues and even labeled China a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance” in 2019, a term that Paris has embraced. But many Europeans are less comfortable getting dragged into a confrontational approach that they sometimes see as more linked to the United States’ fears of losing its global primacy than sound policymaking.
That’s a reality the United States will need to accept as it works with Europe to build a common approach for dealing with China. Successfully countering Beijing will be as much about forging a unified economic strategy as it will be about military matters, and the United States must heed the misgivings, nuances, and interests of its European counterparts—the leaders of one of the world’s largest trading blocs—if it wants its approach to work.
Across the European continent, leaders have carefully calibrated their approach toward Beijing, and it’s clear that they are walking a tightrope trying to balance economic interests with other priorities. Macron isn’t alone in this respect, and his visit to China, accompanied by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, was hardly an isolated incident. A few months ago, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz traveled to China, followed weeks later by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. Both leaders had cordial meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping and were busy negotiating business deals for their respective countries. Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni plans to head to Beijing in May to do the same. Meanwhile, even the loudest proponents of alignment with the United States in Central and Eastern Europe are still part of the 14+1 forum with Beijing—China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine has not changed that. Case in point, just a couple of weeks before the start of the war—a few days after China affirmed its “limitless friendship” with Russia—Polish President Andrzej Duda visited China during the 2022 Winter Olympics, despite boycotts from other countries in the bloc. These diplomatic trends aren’t going anywhere, and the sooner Washington comes to terms with this reality, the better.
While the Biden administration should be praised for forging strong trans-Atlantic unity in supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, it has not been as successful in doing so for China. U.S. President Joe Biden’s signature trans-Atlantic initiative, the Trade and Technology Council, has not led to alignment on digital norms and supply chains. On the contrary, the Biden administration has doubled down on Trump-era protectionism. Trans-Atlantic negotiators still bicker over Trump’s steel tariffs even while the Inflation Reduction Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in August 2022, provides massive subsides to U.S. industry at the expense of European partners.
Moreover, many European leaders doubt the sincerity of their American interlocutors when Washington sets a double standard for its own behavior. For instance, while the United States has pressured Europe to cut ties with China, U.S.-China trade reached a record high of $690 billion in 2022. While the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment was shelved after much trans-Atlantic pressure—and in part because of China’s sanctioning of several EU officials—the Trump administration’s Phase One trade agreement with Beijing is still in place.
Despite the obvious tensions at play, there’s no need for Washington to despair, because a more autonomous Europe will only benefit the United States’ push against China in the long run. To compete with Beijing, Washington will need a credible partner, not a set of aligned clients. There is another way to push back more effectively against Chinese ambitions without getting Europeans to parrot American talking points: By allowing Europe to build up its sovereignty, the United States can reduce the EU’s risk of vulnerability to Chinese external influence. And that’s precisely what Paris has been pushing for.
For the last six years, Macron’s ambition has been to bolster European autonomy, protect critical infrastructure and supply chains, and develop the necessary geopolitical instruments for the continent to compete and defend its own interests and security.
In the last several months, the EU has already gotten a head start on this goal across several domains. It agreed on anti-coercion mechanisms to protect its members against predatory trade pressure, primarily in reaction to China’s attempts to isolate and bully Lithuania for speaking up for Taiwan. The EU’s Chips Act, the Net Zero Industry Act, and the Critical Raw Materials Act might not get headlines, but they are important steps for making Europeans much less dependent on China for batteries, raw materials, hydrogen, and electronic components of key technologies. Paris, in particular, has been at the forefront of these efforts. On broader hot-button technology issues, France has been among the most restrictive countries on Huawei, and its civil servants have been banned from downloading TikTok.
As von der Leyen has said previously, the objective is not to decouple completely, but to “de-risk” European industries from dependence on China. The experience of being beholden to China for pharmaceuticals during COVID-19, or seeing how Russia was able to leverage energy ties for political influence, has fortunately not been lost on leaders in Brussels and EU capitals.
A more autonomous Europe is slowly starting to wake up from its holiday from history on military matters, too. Defense spending is increasing across the continent. France has already increased its defense budget by 25 percent since Macron’s first presidential term began in 2017. It is now considering a bill that, if passed, would continue that trend and ultimately double the nation’s military spending over the course of Macron’s time in office. Germany, the Nordic states, and Poland have announced similar increases.
Plus, Europeans are finally reengaging with their own neighborhood, left too long to Russian and Chinese influence, with a renewed focus on both enlargement and regional integration in the Western Balkans or Eastern Europe. The French-led launch of the European Political Community, just one year after China beat the EU to the punch in distributing vaccines to Western Balkans countries, is a promising start for developing cooperation and infrastructure on a range of important issues.
Instead of expecting alignment, U.S. policymakers need to look for places where both sides’ interests concretely align. For now, Europe’s main strength is leveraging its commercial power. The United States should not undermine this with protectionism, or by opposing the emergence of a European defense industry.
Macron has always been clear that Europeans are not “equidistant” between their U.S. allies and China. A united Europe that defends its own interests and worldview is ultimately a more robust partner for Washington in the long run than allies that are strictly aligned but follow isolated national strategies. An empowered, independent EU may not currently seem enticing to the United States, but Washington should keep in mind that it’s also an EU that China can’t divide and boss around.
