From Copeland v. Netflix, Inc. (D. Del.), decided today by Third Circuit Judge Stephanos Bibas, sitting by designation:
Fame has many costs. One comes from the First Amendment: It shields publishers from lawsuits when they report inaccurately about public figures involved in public controversies (as long as they do so without "actual malice"). This case begins and ends with that First Amendment shield.
While R. Kelly was being tried for sex crimes and child abuse, his personal assistant Diana Copeland went on national TV to discuss what she had seen. Then a documentary about Kelly discussed Copeland's supposed role in his crimes.
Because of this negative coverage, Copeland sued the show's producers and distributors for defaming her, appropriating her name and likeness, and committing related torts. But she had thrust herself into this public controversy and became a public figure in it by appearing on national TV. So she must plausibly plead that defendants had so-called "actual malice"—that they knew (or recklessly disregarded) that the statements featured in the show were false. But she does not. So I now dismiss her defamation claim and other tort claims that recycle it. Plus, she has failed to plausibly plead that defendants used her name and likeness for its unique value (as opposed to its newsworthiness). So I also dismiss her claim of appropriation….
The opinion follows existing First Amendment law, but also illustrates one interesting feature of that law: It essentially imposes a tax on constitutionally protected activity ("thrust[ing one]self into [a] public controversy"), by concluding that people who engage in such activity surrender part of their common-law protections against libel. Had Diana Copeland not chosen to go on a national TV program to discuss the R. Kelly controversy, she may well have had the broader libel law protections offered to private figures (under which she could recover proven compensatory damages on a showing of mere negligence by the defendants, not "actual malice").
