Kenyan religious institutions have become strongly critical of President William Ruto’s government for months now. The criticism grew stronger still recently when the assembly of Catholic bishops bluntly called out the administration for a “culture of lies”, the failure to fulfil campaign promises and the imposition of punitive and exploitative policies.
Kenya’s 2010 constitution provides for the separation of church (religion) and state (politics).
However, the relationship between the two institutions is strong. And personal involvement of politicians in religion and vice versa is still common in the country.
There are two explanations for this.
One, for the politicians a bond with the church may be a strategy to expand their voting base by cultivating a personal image as devout Christians.
Two, for some religious bodies, a supportive relationship with the state is driven by the hope of gaining privileges by supporting the incumbent regime.
According to the 2019 population census, the Kenya government estimated that approximately 85.5% of the total population is Christian and 11% Muslim. Groups constituting less than 2% of the population include Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, and those adhering to various indigenous religious beliefs. Non evangelical Protestants account for 33% of the population and Roman Catholics 21%. Other Christian denominations, including evangelical Protestants, African instituted churches and Orthodox churches, constitute 32%.
When Uhuru Kenyatta came to power (2012-2022), he and his deputy, William Ruto, publicly displayed their attraction to the Pentecostal churches. This trend became more entrenched during the presidency of Ruto.
Today, Ruto’s administration has become unpopular among the citizens. Its policies are viewed as unfavourable to the masses. The national assembly and the opposition have also failed to check the executive. Parliament has been criticised for failing to scrutinise the contentious 2023 Finance Bill. It also passed government-led legislation that has substantially increased the household tax burden. A vacuum has been created, which the church has stepped in to fill by being critical of the state.
I have studied the relationship between religion, state and power. It is my view that religious faiths’ involvement in politics has, and continues to, contribute significantly to the institutionalisation of accountability by the Kenyan political class.
Turbulent relationship
The relationship between the church and state has varied over time.
In the postcolonial era, during the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), the influence of the church on politics wasn’t significant. In his interaction with the public Kenyatta was careful not to show an open bias to a particular faith. As a result the religious sector in his period was more of a partner in development, rather than a critical political voice.
This could also be attributed to the fact that Kenyatta was at the height of his popularity when he was perceived not only as a political leader, but also as a founder and symbol of the new nation.
When Daniel arap Moi came to power in 1978, after the death of Kenyatta, the religious sector was still an integral part of social life in Kenya. During Moi’s presidency, the country witnessed strong involvement of the church in politics. The church was opposed to the one-party-state system, which had dominated the country’s political scene for more than two decades.
The religious sector was among the few forces that dared to publicly express dissatisfaction with the government. The church challenged authoritarianism, human rights abuses and the rigging of elections, which were rampant during Moi’s governance.
The Kenyan government under Moi was extremely unpopular and people used the church pulpit as a forum to express their disenchantment.
But while Moi’s government faced opposition from the main church bodies, he received some support from the evangelical churches.
Risk of toning down criticism
When Mwai Kibaki took over from Moi (2002-2013), the role of the church as the conscience of society against the state was less distinct. Churches that had earlier leaned towards opposition toned down their criticism of government during Kibaki’s first term in office as the president of Kenya.
The first evidence of a critical voice against Kibaki’s leadership actually came from Muslim groups. They were critical of the government’s stance in the constitution review debate, especially with regard to entrenching the Kadhi (Muslim) courts in the country’s constitution. Second, Muslim leaders also expressed outrage over the Suppression of Terrorism Bill, which was seen to target members of the Muslim community in the so called war on terror.
For Kenya’s main churches, the election of Kibaki brought a dilemma during his first term. These churches had been partners of opposition, against the leadership of Moi. With the opposition in power, the mainstream churches had to resolve the dilemma of how to cooperate with the state without compromising their critical role against it.
After the post election violence of 2008, the church was accused of encouraging election violence by preaching ethnic hatred.
Aware that their credibility as an institution had suffered, a section of church leaders embarked on a journey of redemption by declaring a political contest with the government over the 2010 proposed constitution of Kenya.
Clearly, constructive dialogue between the religious sector and the state needs to be maintained because it enhances mutual understanding and cooperation. The religious leaders should continue being critical of the state by challenging unfavourable policies.
Hassan Juma Ndzovu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
