Instead of relying primarily on concentrated missile salvos — the kind seen during last year’s 12-day confrontation with Israel — Tehran is now leaning into a steady rhythm of launches designed to stretch air-defense systems, drain interceptor stockpiles, and keep civilian populations on edge across Israel and multiple Gulf states.
A Wider, Longer Campaign
According to reporting by the Financial Times, Western officials say that since US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets began, Tehran has responded with ballistic missiles and drones in “over 25 waves” across a broad target set. Those targets have included Israel as well as US partners in the Gulf.
The opening phase of the conflict saw Iran unleash waves of ballistic missiles and low-cost drones not only at Israel, but also toward the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar. By the second day, the campaign had expanded to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman, dramatically widening the geographic scope of hostilities.
An Axios report described the unfolding confrontation as an “earthquake in the Gulf,” noting that the conflict directly involves at least 11 countries and has disrupted oil and gas flows while rattling global financial markets.
Iran had warned that any strike on its territory would trigger retaliation not only against Israel but also against US bases across the Gulf and in Iraq. That threat has now materialized.
With US President Donald Trump describing Operation Epic Fury as potentially lasting four to five weeks, the window for escalation remains open. Iran’s reliance on waves of inexpensive drones suggests a strategy built not for a single decisive blow, but for endurance.
The Logic of Cheap Drones
At the center of this strategy is the Shahed-136 drone — slow, noisy, and relatively unsophisticated, yet increasingly central to Iran’s approach.
Bloomberg summed up the asymmetry starkly: “Iran’s Missile Math: $20,000 Drones Take on $4 Million Patriots.” The equation illustrates Tehran’s calculation. Iran does not need to dominate the skies; it needs to make defending them prohibitively expensive.
The Shahed-136, while not technologically advanced, serves three key purposes.
First, it forces defenders to spend money and inventory. Interceptors for systems like the Patriot missile defense platform are costly, and advanced systems such as THAAD come with even higher price tags. Gulf and US defenses have proven effective, but effectiveness carries financial and logistical costs, and stockpiles cannot be replenished overnight.
Second, drones scale. They can be produced in large numbers and launched in waves that need not be perfect to cause disruption. Drone-warfare analyst Seth Frantzman told The New York Times that even when Shaheds underperform compared with more sophisticated weapons, some can still slip through and create panic. “They give the Iranians a cheap air force-like weapons system,” he said.
Third, drones broaden the map of the war. Ballistic missiles aimed at Israel are one dimension of the conflict. Drones drifting toward Gulf cities, ports, hotels, and oil infrastructure blur the line between military targets and civilian life. Countries that might prefer to remain mediators find themselves directly exposed.
The Financial Times described Iran’s approach as a two-track campaign: sustained barrages toward Israel combined with intensive attacks on US partners in the Gulf, including civilian infrastructure alongside military sites. Cheap drones are uniquely suited to both tracks — expendable enough for mass use, yet disruptive enough to generate political pressure.
What’s New in Tehran’s Doctrine
The most striking change is tempo.
In previous confrontations, Iran’s attacks were often large, dramatic, and widely telegraphed — allowing air defenses time to prepare. This time, the rhythm resembles attrition rather than spectacle.
A former Israeli security official quoted by the Financial Times described the new approach as a deliberate “drizzle” compared with last year’s salvos, adding pointedly: “Who said the Iranians will play by our rules?”
The shift includes several elements:
From spectacle to steady pressure
Instead of wagering everything on a few massive barrages, Iran appears to be testing whether constant, smaller attacks can stretch defensive systems, exhaust operators, and force hard decisions about which threats are “worth” intercepting. Some incoming drones are reportedly judged insufficiently dangerous to justify high-end interceptors — a calculation Tehran may be counting on.
A broader strike portfolio
Strikes targeting ports, airports, hotels, and residential areas in Gulf states change the political equation. Benham Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies suggested that Iran may be escalating “hard, fast and early” to create a crisis so intense that US partners pressure Washington and Israel to de-escalate. The underlying aim appears to be contagion — making the war costly for everyone nearby.
A more decentralized posture
Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi has indicated that military units are operating on pre-set guidance rather than constant centralized direction. “Our military units are now in fact independent and somehow isolated and they are acting based on instructions, general instructions given to them in advance,” he said in remarks widely cited in coverage of the conflict.
That framing serves two purposes: it signals resilience in the face of leadership decapitation strikes while also creating distance between civilian leadership and unintended escalation. Araghchi’s comments about strikes outside intended parameters underscore the risk that a semi-autonomous posture could complicate escalation control.
The Strategic Bet: Drain, Fracture, Endure
Iran’s drones are not replacing its missile force; they are sequencing it.
Analysts cited by Bloomberg suggest that large numbers of Shaheds may allow Iran to conserve more destructive ballistic missiles for later phases of the conflict while keeping constant pressure on adversaries. The pattern described by the Financial Times — over 25 waves across Israel and Gulf states — resembles endurance tactics rather than a single retaliatory “answer.”
The psychological effect is significant. In Israel, steady barrages reportedly create a persistent sense of vulnerability, forcing residents to remain close to shelters. In the Gulf, the message is different but equally potent: even cities far from the front line are within reach.
Kelly Grieco of the Stimson Center described the logic succinctly in Bloomberg: an attrition strategy “makes operational sense from Iran’s perspective,” particularly if Tehran believes defenders will exhaust interceptors and that Gulf political cohesion may weaken under sustained strain.
The “drizzle” is therefore not a pause — it is a doctrine built for a scenario in which Iran expects to be struck first, lose senior leaders quickly, and still retain the capacity to keep launching.
What Comes Next
Several constraints will test this strategy.
Air defense adaptation
The longer low-cost drones continue, the more likely defenders are to conserve premium interceptors for high-value missile threats while relying on cheaper countermeasures against drones — including short-range systems, electronic warfare, fighter patrols, and point-defense guns. Bloomberg noted that while the region is well-equipped with high-end missile shields, it has fewer purpose-built anti-drone systems, a gap now under stress.
Potential phase shifts
If Iran assesses that attrition is working — or if its launch infrastructure comes under severe degradation — it may alter the mix: fewer drones and more ballistic missiles, more precise systems, or new target priorities. Efforts to destroy launch capacity could also incentivize “use them or lose them” behavior.
Gulf escalation risks
A reported drone strike on the US Embassy in Riyadh, causing minor damage and a small fire, highlights the growing risk of incidents that could trigger expanded retaliation cycles and raise the stakes for Gulf governments.
The political clock
Attrition strategies are as much political as military. They aim to outlast an opponent’s willingness to pay — financially and psychologically. Cheap drones are central to that logic because they transform endurance from a necessity into a deliberate strategy.
Iran’s evolving retaliation doctrine reflects a sober calculation: wars are not always won by decisive blows. Sometimes they are shaped by who can keep the pressure on longest — and who runs out of patience, or interceptors, first.
