The military junta that took control of Niger at the end of July said on Thursday it would be cutting military ties with the United States and France, both former allies. The move could redefine the fight against Islamist groups in the Sahel region. FRANCE 24's expert on jihadist groups, Wassim Nasr, explains the impact this new policy could have.
Soldiers in Niger detained the country’s president, Mohamed Bazoum, at his home on July 26 and declared a coup. The newly installed junta has since levied criticism at both France and the United States and scrapped its military cooperation with France.
France promptly refused to withdraw its military, stating that only Niger's “legitimate” authorities were entitled to ask it to do so.
Niger is of particular strategic value in the fight against jihadism across the Sahel region, with both the US and France having deployed more than a thousand troops each to the West African nation. US President Joe Biden’s administration sees the country as its best counterterrorism outpost in the Sahel.
Abandoning Niger risks not only a surge in jihadist groups but an ever-greater influence by Russia’s Wagner mercenary group, which is already present in several countries of the Sahel region.
FRANCE 24’s expert on jihadist groups, Wassim Nasr, explains the affects of a possible end to military cooperation between Niger and its Western allies.
FRANCE 24: Niger’s ambassador to the United States, Kiari Liman-Tinguiri, called on the junta Thursday to return 'to reason' and warned that if Niger collapses, the entire Sahel region could fall to jihadists. He said jihadist groups could soon 'control Africa from the coast to the Mediterranean', and thus Europe. Do you share his fears?
Wassim Nasr: I think that it is a bit of an exaggeration. But if Niger enters a phase of chaos, that will surely benefit jihadist groups.
We should define what “chaos” means in this context. One thing is certain, if the military junta stays in power, the policies implemented under President Mohamed Bazoum will unravel.
Supported on the ground by French and US forces, as well as an increasing number of drone purchases, the president waged a war against the terrorists militarily.
The multidimensional battles he fought against the jihadist groups was based on a three-pronged logic: "negotiate, develop, wage war".
The government managed to conduct negotiations with al Qaeda and, in parallel, pursued a policy of “jihadist demobilisation”. Niger’s authorities “took” in jihadist fighters and reintegrated them into local security forces, like in the Diffa and Tillaberi regions.
The government also implemented a development policy, specifically aimed at tackling land issues and agrarian reforms.
All these elements combined meant that, compared to neighbouring countries like Mali or Burkina Faso, Niger saw far fewer attacks and deaths brought on by jihadist groups. If these multidimensional efforts come to an end, security would certainly deteriorate.
But the policies already belong to the past. Military cooperation with France ended as soon as the junta claimed power, making room for jihadist groups [in the region]. And they could choose to follow the same path Burkina Faso or Mali’s junta took, a “fully military” approach with all of the acts of violence against civilians that come with it. That violence makes it mathematically easier for jihadist groups to recruit members. Left bereaved by the army, civilians become driven by a desire for revenge.
What about the potential spread of jihadist groups in the region Liam-Tinguiri alluded to?
Beyond Niger, the Islamic State (IS) group could benefit from the crisis by establishing a corridor between Lake Chad and the Sahel region. It would facilitate the transit of military commanders, fighters and jihadist recruits, who could replenish the ranks of the IS group in the Sahel.
Al Qaeda has been standing in the way of the IS group. The two are in conflict, particularly in the three border regions [between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger].
But if the Islamic State group becomes stronger and were to gain the upper hand over al Qaeda, the doors to countries in the Gulf of Guinea would open.
If Russia’s Wagner Group admits it is present in Niger, what consequences would this have?
On the ground, the Wagner Group doesn’t contribute much security-wise to the junta. In the fight against jihadist groups, Niamey had no better allies than France and the US. The Russians are not efficient in that regard.
Mali bears witness to this (as French troops left the country in 2022, Russian mercenaries increased their presence). For the past year and a half, jihadist attacks have multiplied in the country and the IS group now has a sanctuary there. It even benefits from a no-fly zone that protects jihadist groups.
For the junta in Niger, on the other hand, the drive to gain support from Wagner is political, as they need allies to stay in power. The Wagner Group is not Russia, but since it works in Moscow’s interests, it’s associated with the Kremlin.
This vague relationship poses a political dilemma for France, which is now asking itself: “Should we strike Wagner or not?” For the junta, the mercenary group acts as a shield against foreign intervention and strengthens them in relation to their rivals inside the country.
The US army has a drone base in Agadez in northern Niger. If it shuts down, what consequences would that have?
The drone base is a fundamental factor. Let’s not forget that it is now impossible for a foreign presence to stay in Niger without the consent of the junta. From their point of view, tolerating a US presence would be tantamount to accepting the current situation. That is why keeping the drone base doesn’t seem like a plausible outcome [for the junta].
Washington and Paris are fully aware of the importance of this local security bolt hole. If it fails, others will follow.
This US drone base may be based in Niger, but it doesn’t concern the country so much as the region as a whole. It covers the entire Sahel.
