Thousands of Iranians came out on the streets to mark the funeral processions of Iran’s president Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran, Mashhad, and Tabriz, after he died in a helicopter crash alongside the foreign minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian. During these processions, huge banners were put up naming Raisi as “the martyr of service”, while other banners carried phrases such as “farewell to the servant of the disadvantaged”.
The status of martyr of service means his death was caused by his duty to serve the public as president.
In Iran, the martyr narrative is a long-recognised concept in religious tales, politics and literature.
The Iranian leadership appears to be trying to use Raisi’s death on May 19 – and his martyrdom – as a way of creating more public support in the upcoming election, and potentially prompt a higher turnout on June 28.
Raisi was a political hardliner and was close to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Shortly after the crash, he was declared a martyr on Iranian state TV and was buried in his home city of Mashhad at Iran’s largest Shia shrine, Imam Reza. Imam Reza is Iran’s spiritual capital and has great significance for the country’s history, culture and politics. So the formal announcement of Raisi’s martyrdom at the shrine is significant.
Government statements after the crash underlined how it wanted to cast Raisi’s death as an almost religious moment. A statement from the Iranian foreign ministry said that: “The esteemed martyrs of the bitter and tragic incident sincerely gave up their blessed lives to serve Islam and beloved Iran, and they have achieved the great blessing of martyrdom in the path of honest and sincere service to the noble nation of Iran.”
Martyrdom as a concept is drawn from religious roots, but has a significant political and cultural role in Iran. The government’s use of martyrdom expanded substantially during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), when around 750,000 Iranians lost their lives as soldiers or civilians. Thousands of ordinary people were hailed as martyrs for defending their country in this period.
In 1980 the state established the Martyrs’ Foundation (Bonyād-e Šahīd) to support those injured or disabled in the war and the families of the dead, by the order of the leader of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Throughout the nation’s history, the question of who a martyr is and what their role might be has changed. New concepts of martyrdom have emerged during the past few years and have been increasingly used by both government and the opposition. For instance, protesters during the Arab Spring were hailed by some as martyrs – but this was martyr status awarded by the public, rather than the government.
Opponents of the regime also used the concept of martyrdom during the 2022 protests and uprising to name protesters as martyrs for their political activism against the government. In their eyes, martyrs are those who are brutally killed at the hands of the state. Martyrdom, therefore, is also an essential part of the commemoration of the protests.
Positioning Raisi as a martyr – and underlining his role and sacrifice – comes weeks ahead of Iranians heading to the polls to vote for a new president in line with Article 131 of the constitution. Early presidential elections must be held within 50 days of a president’s death.
Raisi won the last presidential election in June 2021 with 18 million of the 28.9 million votes cast, according to government figures. But public turnout was 48.8% — a significant decline from the previous election in 2017. Public participation also decreased in parliamentary elections in March 2024. According to Iran’s interior minister, Ahmad Vahidi, only 41% of the 61 million eligible voters participated in the elections, one of the lowest turnouts since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
This might suggest public disaffection with the electoral system. But the question now is can the current leadership use the death of Raisi to encourage the public to participate in the election? And will the strategy of using martyrdom work?
It is not yet clear whether the idea of political martyrdom will mobilise either fundamentalists or other political groups. But it’s possible that it can be used to create increased political backing for the current political power structure at the upcoming election, and possibly boost turnout.
Sahar Maranlou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
