Facing an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe, Haiti is on the brink of state failure. No stranger to political and economic emergencies, the Caribbean country has been the focus of a half dozen United Nations peacekeeping missions since the 1990s. But never has this long-suffering nation seen the array of cascading crises now converging on its estimated 11.8 million residents: Some 4.7 million people are threatened by acute hunger, including around 2.4 million children. Cholera is spreading across most of the country’s departments. A succession of natural disasters has compounded these miseries.
Yet the country’s worst afflictions, including an ongoing security crisis paralyzing the nation, are fundamentally man-made. The underlying drivers of Haiti’s woes are complex, but metastasized criminal gangs and the predatory political and economic corruption that enable them have made the country’s plight immeasurably worse. If left unattended, Haiti’s security crisis will only deepen, leading to further upheaval at home and beyond, with grim implications for regional stability.
Gangs have a long history in Haiti. For decades, they have been weaponized by senior politicians, bureaucrats, and business elites to suppress dissent, sway elections, and offer protection. But today, these criminal networks—currently estimated to consist of about 200 armed groups—are multiplying and decoupling from their traditional patrons. To finance their operations, gangs are diversifying their traditional criminal activities beyond intimidation-for-hire and neighborhood extortion to include drug trafficking and money laundering.
Haiti’s latest food insecurity and cholera outbreaks are inextricably linked to the increasing power of criminal gangs and the social disarray they accelerate. Gang rule is hindering access to basic relief, blocking fuel supplies, and profoundly disturbing services at various institutions from hospitals and clinics to schools and markets. A forthcoming assessment with the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime—which I helped write—will show that one reason Haiti’s criminal groups are so potent is their access to increasingly powerful firearms, ammunition, and drugs. Another factor is that the Haitian elite has enabled them for decades.
Dozens of elected and appointed government officials have been implicated in corruption, money laundering, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking to bolster their power and influence. A slew of recent sanctions targeting current and former Haitian officials—including travel bans, asset freezes, and arms embargoes—have implicated only a sliver of those people suspected of being involved in or supporting criminal gangs. The U.N. Security Council, for example, has sanctioned only one individual, Jimmy Chérizier (also known as “Barbecue”), a former police chief and current head of the notorious Fòs Revolisyonè G9 gang. Britain, Canada, and the United States, on the other hand, have sanctioned a veritable who’s who of Haiti’s elite.
Reversing Haiti’s deepening insecurity crisis will be difficult if the country cannot restore some semblance of legitimate governance.
Included on the sanctions list by both Ottawa and Washington, for example, are Youri Latortue, a former Haitian Senate president, and Joseph Lambert, the sitting Senate president. The Canadians have also singled out former President Michel Martelly as well as two former prime ministers, Laurent Lamothe and Jean-Henry Céant. Meanwhile, the U.S. Treasury Department targeted the U.S. assets of Haitian Sen. Rony Célestin and former Sen. Richard Lenine Hervé Fourcand, both accused of facilitating drug trafficking activities.
And for the first time, a government has targeted Haitian businesspeople. In late 2022, Canada sanctioned Haiti’s wealthiest citizen, Gilbert Bigio (who resides in the United States), together with business leaders Reynold Deeb and Sherif Abdallah. Canada accuses them of corruption, money laundering, and involvement in protecting and enabling armed gangs. Corruption and patronage networks, such as those described by Canada, have long incubated Haiti’s criminal markets. No surprise, then, that Haiti is tied with four countries to be ranked 171st out of 180 nations in Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index and 179th out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking, last released in 2020.
The involvement of Haiti’s political and economic elite in supercharging gangs is one reason why the country’s downward spiral has been many years in the making and long precedes the 2021 assassination of then-Haitian President Jovenel Moïse. Heavily armed gangs now roaming the country and terrorizing cities, villages, and the countryside are amplifying the nation’s humanitarian disasters. Criminal federations and networks such as G9, G-PEP, and 400 Mawozo control significant portions of key cities, including nearly three-quarters of the capital, Port-au-Prince. Gang violence has caused widespread fear and forced almost 100,000 residents to flee Port-au-Prince last year. By virtually every measure of insecurity—including homicide, sexual violence, kidnappings, police killings, internal displacement, and emigration—Haitians are worse off than ever before.
The significant inflow of illegal firearms and ammunition has made Haiti even more dangerous and volatile. This is an imported scourge, as Haiti does not manufacture firearms. Instead, all weapons and ammunition are procured abroad. Although some firearms are legally acquired and then subsequently diverted into criminal markets, most are smuggled into the country. Straw-man purchases across the United States, especially in pro-gun states with loose firearms regulations, are the preferred method for smugglers. Thereafter, they are typically trafficked by land, air, or (most commonly) sea from South Florida to Haitian ports, such as Port-au-Prince and Port-de-Paix. Occasionally, firearms and ammunition are routed to Haiti via the Dominican Republic, transiting across one of many porous border crossings between the two countries, including Belladère, Ouanaminthe, Malpasse, and Anse-à-Pitres. Illicit drugs, weapons, and cash also arrive via irregular flights to clandestine airstrips. Seizures by Haitian and U.S. authorities reveal an increasing number of high-caliber firearms destined for Haiti from the United States.
Drug transshipment through Haiti also provides hard currency for gangs to acquire heavy firepower. Haiti has long served as a transit country for cocaine, cannabis, and even the odd consignment of heroin and amphetamines, which are typically transported by boat or plane and then broken down into smaller parcels before being moved by land to the Dominican Republic. Corruption and criminal gangs ease the way for drug traffickers. Most of the cocaine passing through Haiti is believed to originate in Colombia and ends up in North America and Western Europe. Most of the cannabis entering Haiti is produced in Jamaica and primarily shipped to the Dominican Republic to service a thriving tourist market; smaller amounts reach North America and Western Europe. (Although private cannabis consumption and regulated distribution is now legal in many jurisdictions, unregulated trade is not.) Seizure data suggests that drug shipments to Haiti have passed through the Bahamas, Costa Rica, Panama, Turks and Caicos, and Venezuela. Haitian customs officials estimate that they interdict less than 10 percent of the drugs passing through the country.
Given years of governance failures, Haiti’s security forces are badly outmatched. National police, customs, border patrols, and the Haitian Coast Guard Commission require significant support to disrupt illegal trafficking in firearms and drugs, much less stop organized gangs. Some officials have also been implicated in diverting firearms and ammunition from their own arsenals to criminal groups; only last July, the Haitian customs commissioner was arrested for her suspected involvement in illegal arms shipments. The Haitian police force is severely understaffed: Only around 9,000 of its approximately 14,000 personnel are on active duty at any given time. With just 1.6 officers for every 1,000 residents (compared to around 3.3 officers per 1,000 people in the neighboring Dominican Republic), Haiti has one of the lowest police-to-civilian ratios in the world. The border police (with 294 officers for the entire country), anti-narcotics brigade (317 people), and coast guard (181 people) are equally under-resourced. Additionally, the police are facing increasing attacks from gangs, with 18 officers killed in January alone. The recent assault led by the Kraze Baryé gang, a group accused of kidnapping missionaries and demolishing a local police station, is a reminder of the dangers facing police officers and their families.
Haiti’s challenging geography—1,100 miles of jagged coastline and a 244-mile land border with the Dominican Republic—makes command and control all the harder. Even a far larger security and border force than what Haiti has today would be hard-pressed to keep pace with the illegal networks behind drug trafficking and contraband there. An added cause for concern is that Haiti imports nearly all of its food and fuel. The coast guard, in particular, operates with just one functioning vessel, with several others either inoperable or undergoing repairs. Despite these operational constraints and constant threats from smugglers, Haitian customs officials continue to conduct search and seizure operations, albeit under considerable risk: Look no further than the recent assassination attempt on the head of customs in Belladère. The lack of aerial and maritime domain awareness, limited physical presence in airports and seaports, and the absence of scanners and X-ray machines render Haiti’s borders essentially porous.
To restore security and stability in Haiti, a comprehensive approach is needed that combines progress on governance and elections with security and humanitarian action. The U.N. Security Council and several individual countries are considering expanding sanctions to a wider constellation of individuals supporting criminal gangs. The U.N. mission in Haiti has joined Haiti’s call for the deployment of an international specialized force to operate alongside the Haitian National Police. Although Haitians traditionally bristle at foreign intervention, as many as 70 percent of the population now support external security assistance, especially from people residing in gang-controlled areas. Several U.N. member states have voiced support for a rapid reaction force, with some countries even offering to send military and police support. But any security strategy must combine critical law enforcement support with a host of other measures, not least community policing, criminal justice reform, and anti-corruption programs.
Alongside humanitarian assistance, immediate priorities should include intelligence-led police measures to tackle criminal gangs, enhance the operational capacities of law enforcement, control the inflow of firearms and transshipment of drugs, and support border and customs institutions. Over time, the focus should shift to police vetting, recruitment, training, and professionalization; community policing; social and economic support; criminal justice reform; and reducing elite impunity through anti-corruption and transparency measures. Additionally, regional cooperation with organizations such as the Caribbean Community and the Organization of American States could play a key role in addressing firearms and drug trafficking, with early warning and technical support being areas of potential assistance.
Reversing Haiti’s deepening insecurity crisis, however, will be difficult if the country cannot restore some semblance of legitimate governance. As of now, Haiti does not have a single democratically elected official. The last 10 remaining senators to be chosen by popular vote left office in January, with no elected officials taking their place. Haiti has not held an election since Moïse’s assassination despite promises from Prime Minister Ariel Henry. Although a transition council was appointed this month, prospects for elections before 2024 are dim, and a short-term political solution seems out of reach. And even if elections were called, how many citizens would turn out when casting a vote in a climate of political violence could mean putting your life at risk? Without a modicum of security and a transparent political process, an election could merely reinforce the dysfunctional status quo.
With gangs on the offensive, the challenges of restoring security are only going to grow more difficult. The threat of an international intervention has caught the attention of gang leaders and could frighten some gang members off. But as long as the international community dithers and the Haitian elite are not put under pressure to cut their ties to crime, gangs will feel emboldened to act with impunity. Disrupting their supply of firearms and ammunition—as well as drug running and other criminal activities that help pay for them—is an essential part of any response. In the end, the only durable solutions will be Haitian-led, but the regional and transnational factors that are fueling them—from the supply of weapons to the consumption of drugs—must be simultaneously disrupted.
