The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is trying his best to shake up the dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine war. He recently undertook a major cabinet reshuffle in which he replaced no fewer than nine ministers, including his foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba. Announcing the changes, Zelensky said he wanted his government to be “more active” in pressing for aid from its western allies.
These cabinet changes came as Ukraine pressed ahead with its offensive in the Kursk oblast in Russia. Zelensky has said that holding some Russian territory will give Kyiv leverage for future territorial exchange negotiations with Russia.
And, while criticism of Zelensky’s gamble has increased as Ukraine’s position in the Donbas in the east of the country has deteriorated, seeing Ukrainian soldiers turn the table on Russia has undeniably given Ukrainians a morale boost.
Ukrainians needed this. As the war has endured and its costs mounted, morale and public health have suffered.
We have tracked Ukrainian sentiment for years. In June and July 2024, in cooperation with the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology (KIIS), we conducted a telephone public opinion survey of 2,200 respondents representative of the adult population of government-controlled areas of Ukraine. This was to follow up on a survey from October 2022.
We should treat wartime polls with caution. But our survey findings suggest people are worried about war weariness among their fellow Ukrainians. It also suggests that there is growing, if reluctant, support for negotiations and territorial concessions.
Open to compromise
Attitudes among Ukrainians toward territorial concessions have also started to shift – but only slightly. Most people have opposed giving up land since 2014, but KIIS’s own regular omnibus survey provides evidence of growing recognition, now shared by one-third of Ukrainians, that territorial concessions may be necessary.
In June-July 2024 we repeated a question we asked in October 2022 on territorial concessions, shown in the figure below. “All choices about what to do during this current Russian aggression have significant, but different, costs. Knowing this, which of the following four choices should the Ukraine government take at this time?”
The biggest change was this: in 2022, 71% of respondents supported the proposition to “continue opposing Russian aggression until all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, is liberated”, but in 2024 the support for that option had dropped to 51%.
In 2022, just 11% agreed with “trying to reach an immediate ceasefire by both sides with conditions and starting intensive negotiations”. In 2024, that share had increased to 31%.
But there are differences in how people look at these choices. Much depends on whether they have been displaced (though whether they lost family members or friends does not seem to make a difference), whether they worry about war fatigue among their fellow Ukrainians, and whether they are optimistic or pessimistic about western support.
There is more at stake in this war than territory — not least, saving lives, ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty, and protecting the country’s future security. KIIS’s own recent research has shown that in a hypothetical negotiation scenario, people’s views on the importance of preserving territorial integrity might depend on how any possible deal might safeguard other things they care about.
For two and a half years, the brutal war has affected everyday lives of Ukrainians, and many (43%) believe that the war will last at least another year. Most of the respondents in our survey had not been physically injured in Russian violence (12% had), but about half had witnessed Russian violence, and most had lost a close family member or friend (62%). About one-third had been displaced from their homes.
Consistent with an increasing number of reports, the survey shows growing recognition of war fatigue. Rather than asking directly about whether respondents felt this themselves, we asked whether they worried about it among fellow Ukrainians. The results were revealing: 58% worry “a lot” and 28% worry “a little”, whereas only 10% report that they do not worry about war fatigue.
While there are signs of war weariness among Ukraine’s western allies, our surveys show that Ukrainians are still broadly optimistic about continued western support, though less so than in October 2022. About 19% believe western support will grow (down from 29% in 2022), while 35% believe it will stay the same (41% in 2022). Almost a quarter (24%) believe it will continue but at a lower level than now (up from 16% in 2022), and 13% believe it is unlikely to continue (up from 3% in 2022).
Life or death
Research from early on in the war showed that Ukrainians strongly preferred strategies that preserved the country’s political autonomy and restored the entirety of its territory. This would hold, “even if making concessions would reduce projected civilian and military deaths, or the risk of a nuclear strike over the next three months”.
As the authors of the study pointed out: “Russian control of the government in Kyiv or of territories in the east would put the lives of many Ukrainians at risk, as it is well documented that Russia has committed widespread human rights violations in temporarily occupied territories.”
Given the war’s accumulating death toll, in our 2024 survey we designed a simple framing experiment that can give us an indication of whether considerations about loss of life may shape people’s views on negotiations. We asked half of the respondents, randomly selected, if they would accept that “Ukraine concede some of its territories to end the war”. About 24% said yes.
For the other half, we asked if they would accept that “Ukraine concede some of its territories to save lives and end the war”. In that case, 34% said yes. So, if – rightly or wrongly – territorial concessions are associated with saving lives, it increases support for them.
But when asked directly in the 2024 survey if they agreed with the statement “Russia should be allowed to control the territory it has occupied since 2022”, 90% disagreed. So while there is still majority – if diminished – support for fighting to restore full territorial integrity, there is growing support for negotiations.
What we also know from our surveys is that there is very little evidence that Russia’s territorial annexations will ever have any legitimacy among Ukrainians.
Kristin M. Bakke has received funding for research in Ukraine from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) and the Research Council of Norway.
Gerard Toal has received funding from the US National Science Foundation and the Research Council of Norway.
John O’Loughlin receives funding from US National Science Foundation
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
