Mass protests have been taking in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. Over 100,000 Georgians who support their country joining the EU have taken to the streets since November 28 in response to the government’s recent announcement that it has suspended EU accession negotiations and will reject EU funding until at least 2028.
The ruling Georgian Dream party blames the EU for the failure of accession talks. Announcing the decision, the prime minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, claimed Brussels was attempting to “blackmail” Georgia and “organise a revolution in the country”.
Kobakhidze’s announcement came just a month after the Georgian Dream party claimed a mandate having won a third term at parliamentary elections at the end of October – elections that were reportedly fraught with irregularities.
Georgian Dream claimed its victory was a reflection of the will of the people. But observer missions, both international and domestic, said the elections were neither free nor fair.
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was monitoring the campaign noted imbalances in financial resources between competing parties, extreme and divisive rhetoric and widespread reports of intimidation and bribery.
Georgian Dream, founded and led by pro-Russian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, has spent years attempting to derail the country’s relationship with the EU. This is despite integration into the EU being enshrined in the Georgian constitution and public support for membership holding steady at around 85%. The EU granted Georgia candidate status in 2023.
Georgian Dream has failed to meet any of the election promises it made in 2012. When it first came to office it promised to improve democracy and rule of law. In fact, behind the scenes, Ivanishvili’s party has slowly taken over control of what should be independent democratic institutions such as the judiciary and the security forces.
Critics say it has created an entire shadow network that relies on corruption to influence political processes, undermining efforts to improve the quality of Georgia’s democracy and rule of law that are necessary for EU integration.
Meanwhile Ivanishvili and his party have also maintained a strong relationship with Russia. The country refused to adopt sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine and has reportedly detained Russian nationals trying to flee conscription.
Earlier this year the government passed laws that openly defy EU principles. In May, Georgia adopted what is known as the “foreign agents” law. Modelled on similar legislation passed in Russia in 2022, this law requires NGOs receiving more than 20% of funding from abroad to register.
Georgia’s civil society sector is 90% funded from abroad, so this law puts virtually all NGOs working on issues related to democracy and rule of law in a vulnerable position. Critics believe the government will use this law to eliminate dissenting voices.
In July the government also passed sweeping anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, claiming it was in line with Christian and European values. But the laws went completely against EU guidelines regarding discrimination.
Before the laws were introduced the then EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell warned they would derail Georgia’s EU accession. And, after the foreign agents law was passed last July, the EU did indeed halt accession talks, but continued to provide funding aimed at supporting Georgia’s path towards membership. Now Kobakhidze says Georgia will not accept any EU funds until 2028.
Is the EU playing difficult?
The EU has released a statement condemning the use of force to break up protests, regretting the suspension of talks and reiterating its concerns about democratic backsliding in Georgia. EU Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, said that the “door to the EU remains open” to Georgia as long as it meets EU requirements for economic and political reform.
But – both in the past and now – the EU has been inconsistent in its requirements. When Georgia first applied for candidacy status in March 2022, the EU responded with a list of “12 priorities” to be met before the country could progress with its application.
These included addressing political polarisation, ensuring the independence of democratic institutions, and what it called “de-oligarchisation” – to reduce the influence of vested interests in economic, political, and public life.
Candidacy status was granted in December 2023, despite Georgia not meeting a number of those recommendations. At that point it listed nine steps the country needed to take before it could join.
This lack of consistency may have partly been because these processes are unchartered territory for the EU. But it’s also almost certainly due to Brussels responding to broader political and geopolitical trends. Until the war in Ukraine, the EU was not considering adding new countries to the accession list.
It was already struggling with rising populism, nationalism and issues with rule of law in some of its member states, including Hungary and Poland. Yet, as geopolitical tensions have risen, the EU has also been trying to keep a foot in the south Caucasus, giving it additional reasons to keep Georgia close.
At the same time, joining up with the west is no longer the only viable option for Georgia. Russia and China are also pressuring the Georgian government into closer ties with alternative sources of support.
And this doesn’t just apply to Georgia. There is a growing list of countries in the western Balkans and eastern Europe that are struggling to progress in the accession process – including Serbia, Bosnia and Turkey.
This is not all the fault of Brussels, obviously. Many of these countries have work to do in terms of the quality of their democracy. But the EU may need to take a good look at its approach to accession processes in light of the changing geopolitical situation. It will need to do more to welcome a new member to the EU than just saying that the door is open.
Amy Eaglestone does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
