In the quarter-century of Vladimir Putin’s rule – he has served as prime minister or president since August 1999 – the former KGB man has attempted to sell to the public the image of strongman, savior and defender of the Russian people.
Indeed, the “special military operation” in Ukraine, as the Kremlin has described the invasion, was presented as a humanitarian project to save ethnic Russians in Ukraine.
Yet, the reality is rather different. Since the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022, Putin’s inability to protect the Russian population has been shown time and again. Numerous towns in Russia, including Moscow, have been subject to drone attacks. In June 2023, Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin led a short-lived mutiny that saw rebel troops turn from Ukraine and march though Russian towns, causing casualties.
Perhaps most humiliating for Putin has been Ukraine’s speedy and sustained incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. Since Aug. 6, 2024, Ukrainian forces have taken over 490 square miles of Russian territory, resulting in the evacuation or fleeing of over 100,000 Russians, some of whom reported feeling “left under fire” and frustrated by media downplaying the severity of the situation.
The Ukrainian advance is the most serious challenge to Putin’s narrative of the war since the invasion began. It also risks making the Russian leader look vulnerable and weak.
As a scholar of post-Soviet states, I see echoes of the past in Putin’s present. When confronted by crises, Putin has often struggled to respond to the needs of Russian people decisively and quickly. Since President Boris Yeltsin appointed the then-unknown apparatchik as prime minister on Aug. 9, 1999, Putin has seemed more preoccupied with the myth of the savior than the actual saving of lives.
The Battle of Kursk (redux)
Kursk plays an important and complicated role for Putin and Russia.
The Battle of Kursk of 1944 was a decisive Soviet victory in the “Great Patriotic War,” as many Russians refer to World War II. It is a potent symbol of the sacrifice and victory that has become part of Russia’s national identity under Putin.
As such, Ukraine’s rapid advance though the region in recent weeks – during which it captured dozens of settlements and Russian soldiers – has been a major blow to Moscow. Russian media was quick to compare the invasion of Kursk with that of Nazi Germany, invoking the gravitas of the situation.
Yet, Putin’s response has been slow and, to many observers, puzzling. After several days of silence and avoidance, a visibly upset Putin held a televised meeting with top security officials and regional governors, in which he promised a “worthy response” and payment of 10,000 rubles (US$150) for residents displaced by the incursion. But there was no mass evacuation or clear guidance to the Kursk population until several days later.
While the incursion of Kursk was underway, Putin delegated the “situation” to others. Instead, he traveled to Azerbaijan for a meeting with President Ilham Aliyev and visited a horticultural farm.
Lessons from another ‘Kursk’
Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk, and Putin’s response, has echoes of yet another earlier “Kursk” crisis: the 2000 sinking of the nuclear submarine that bears the region’s name. The Kursk sank during exercises in the Barents Sea after an explosion on Aug. 12, 2000, in the torpedo hatch killed most of the 118-member crew.
Some 23 survivors of the initial blast barricaded themselves in a compartment of the sub, awaiting rescue. The explosions were picked up by the seismographs in Europe, and numerous countries offered assistance in rescue. But Putin refused the foreign help until it was too late; on Aug. 21, Norwegian divers reached the drowned sub to find all the crew members dead.
The Kursk disaster exposed what critics claimed was “political paralysis” at the Kremlin, with Putin – just a year into his tenure – criticized directly for keeping silent on the disaster for days. He refused to interrupt his vacation in Sochi on the Black Sea, and on Aug. 18 – six days into the crisis – opted to travel to Yalta in Ukrainian Crimea for an informal meeting with the heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States, hosted by the then-president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma.
On Aug. 23, 2000, a reluctant Putin met with families of the drowned crew in their hometown of Vidyayevo.
Despite tight control on foreign media access, the unpleasant exchanges between Putin and angry grieving mothers appeared on Russian TV. It was a disaster for Putin’s image.
According to a witness, Putin was enraged by the media portrayal of him, accusing the TV channels of hiring “10-dollar whores” to discredit him.
Failure in the face of terrorism
Since Putin’s encounter with the victims’ families in 2000, Russia’s tightly controlled media has fallen much more in line with the Kremlin’s project of portraying Putin as “protector.”
Leaning into this narrative, pro-Putin media often frame the Ukrainians in the current war as “terrorists” and “Nazis.”
But Putin’s handling of actual terrorist situations again highlights his failure to protect Russian lives.
Take his handling of the attack in Beslan, a city in North Ossetia, five years into his tenure. On Sept. 1, 2004, a group of over 30 armed militants stormed a school and took over 1,000 hostages, including children, teachers and some family members.
The hostages were held in the gymnasium without food or water until Sept. 3, when Russian special forces entered the building. The siege ended in a chaotic battle in which hundreds of hostages were killed, including 186 children.
Survivors and relatives accused the Russian government, including Putin, of mishandling the situation and sued the government in the European Court of Human Rights. The court ruled that the Russian government “failed to protect the hostages.”
Disproportionate use of force, mishandling and corruption have been running themes in Russia’s responses to terrorist attacks. During Putin’s quarter-century in charge, Russian has seen over a dozen terrorist attacks, the latest of which, an attack by affiliates of the Islamic State group at a Moscow concert on March 22, 2024, rivals Beslan in regard to loss of life.
Putin visited Beslan on Aug. 20, 2024, and attempted to link the current events in Kursk to the attack, saying that “enemies are again trying to destabilize the country.” What is common in both cases is Putin was unable to protect Russians.
Protecting Russians or his image?
The Ukrainian incursion of Kursk, which has been a success so far, has put Putin’s image as a tough protector in serious danger – and not for the first time.
No doubt, Russian propaganda will do what it needs to do to protect the Russian president in front of a domestic audience.
But never in Putin’s 25 years in power has this image appeared so vulnerable – what is coming through is less a protector, and more someone protecting an image.
Lena Surzhko Harned does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
