A close relationship between France and Germany has long been regarded as postwar Europe’s engine, underpinning the foundation of the EU, the single currency and much more. But the engine has been spluttering, and over the past two years tensions and disagreements have piled up. This is ironic because, on paper at least, French and German views on Europe have never been closer. Emmanuel Macron is arguably the most pro-European French president in a generation, and Olaf Scholz’s coalition has vowed to turn the EU into a federal state, in sharp contrast to the view that dominated in the Merkel years.
And yet on critical areas of cooperation for Europe, France and Germany couldn’t be further apart, which is a serious risk for Europe at a time of great geopolitical peril. While the war in Ukraine – and Scholz’s bold call in February 2022 for a Zeitenwende (turning point) and an end to Germany’s traditionally reticent foreign policy – should have paved the way for a real leap in integrated European defence, the reality is that nothing meaningful has been done. In fact, many Franco-German defence cooperation projects have gone backwards.
