The overthrow of Nikita Khrushchev from the posts of first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and the leader of the Soviet state in October 1964 was an unprecedented event in the history of the Soviet Union.
The old leader was deposed by the opposition without violence. He was not imprisoned or killed after losing power. While his predecessors Lenin and Stalin and successors Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko all died in power, Khrushchev was sent into retirement, where he lived under supervision for another seven years.
Unlike the era of the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union did not disintegrate when its leader had to relinquish power. Six decades have now passed since what has become known as the “most democratic coup” in Soviet history – sometimes referred to as the “little October revolution”.
Khrushchev, who rose to power on the death of Josef Stalin in 1953, actually came close to being overthrown as early as 1957. At that time, Stalin’s former collaborators and close comrades, including Georgy Malenkov and Vyacheslav Molotov, opposed him. They even gained an upper hand in the party’s highest body, the presidium. But Khrushchev was saved by the support of the army leadership, the KGB political police and the wider party leadership, the central committee.
Seven years later, however, he was brought down by politicians from the next generation – men who largely owed their powerful positions to him.
Strongest among them was Leonid Brezhnev, who duly took Khrushchev’s place as first secretary (shortly afterwards renaming his position general secretary, the same title as Stalin). Next in line was Alexander Shelepin, the powerful secretary of the party’s central committee who had run the KGB from 1958 to 1961.
The role of the KGB, which in October 1964 was headed by Shelepin’s successor Vladimir Semichastny, was crucial in ensuring Khrushchev’s downfall, as its ninth directorate – which was responsible for the protection of state officials – not only protected but also constantly monitored them.
Semichastny not only knew about the revolt against Khrushchev but was actively involved in it. Had he informed the leader about the plotting, pretty much what he was in the job to do, Khrushchev would more than likely have averted the palace coup this time as well.
In his memoirs, Semichastny even mentioned the fact that Brezhnev raised the possibility of Khrushchev’s assassination during one conversation with him. But this plan was never put into action. In the event the plot to remove the Soviet leader was completed by non-violent means.
Reforming leader
Khrushchev has gone down in history as a reformer who wanted to make Soviet communism less brutal. He strongly criticised Stalin for his abuse of power but, at the same time, he gradually increased his own powers.
His efforts at political and economic reforms stopped when they posed a threat to maintaining the monopoly of communist power. Despite paying lip service to the idea of less heavy-handed domination of the Soviet bloc from Moscow, he became known for his bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, he then brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.
His initially positive reforms improved the living standards) of the people in his country, but later became chaotic and led to social unrest, including the massacre of workers in Novocherkassk in 1962 and the need to buy grain from the west, which he had previously wanted to ideologically “bury”.
Also, the rift between the Soviet Union and China at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s caused a certain resentment in Moscow. Khrushchev’s moves towards liberalisation had not caused the rift, which was more due to China’s increased authoritarianism under Mao Zedong during that era. This was exacerbated by border disputes between the two countries as well as disagreements over international relations. But Khrushchev’s critics felt he could – and should – have handled relations more skilfully.
Fall and legacy
Having faced down a coup attempt in 1957, by October 1964 Khrushchev found himself politically isolated and without support in either the presidium or in the central committee. His opponents forced him to return prematurely from his vacation in the Georgian report town of Pitsunda to Moscow where he was confronted by his political opponents, led by Brezhnev with the support of other powerful politicians, including Shelepin, Alexei Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov.
Realising his supporters in the presidium were in the minority and that to retain power would mean involving the army or KGB, which he was not confident would back him, Khruschev resigned.
Reflecting on how his leadership had rejected Stalinism, he is reported to have said: “I am glad that, finally, the party has matured and can control any individual.”
But Brezhnev, who manoeuvred himself into power in Khrushchev’s stead, learned from the fall of his predecessor and tightened his grip on the levers of power. Yet the Soviet Union – thanks in large part to Khrushchev – never returned the state terror and mass murder of Stalinism.
The Soviet Union was to experience another coup attempt against a leader in 1991, when conservative opponents tried to overthrow another reformer, Mikhail Gorbachev. But this attempt, much less prepared and elaborate and lacking the necessary wider support, failed. The Soviet Union collapsed and was formally disbanded just a few months later.
But for many people, it’s Khrushchev whose reforms and governing style began the gradual disintegration of the Soviet Union as far back as the 1950s, partly thanks to his efforts to impose more democratisation. It is not surprising that the current Russian president, Vladimir Putin, disdains him – especially since Khrushchev, according to Putin, “senselessly donated” Crimea to Ukraine in 1954.
At least Khrushchev himself was able to live to focus on the positives. He would recall in his memoir how he freed his country from the suffocating fear of Stalinism and was able to raise a generation of younger politicians who were finally not afraid to stand up to him. Sadly, this is no longer a hallmark under the current leadership.
Tomas Sniegon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
