From Monday's decision by Judge Douglas Harpool (W.D. Mo.) in McClanahan v. Trump, which I think reaches the correct result:
On December 11, 2019, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13899, directing federal agencies to use the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance ("IHRA") definition of antisemitism in enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. On January 29, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14188 titled Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism. It states that it shall be the policy of the United States to combat anti-Semitism vigorously, using all available and appropriate legal tools, to prosecute, remove, or otherwise hold to account the perpetrators of unlawful anti-Sematic harassment and violence.
Plaintiff alleges Executive Order 14188 orders the Department of Education and Department of Justice to investigate individuals and institutions critical of Israel and to withhold federal funding from universities that allow such criticisms. Plaintiff alleges that Executive Order 13899 and its expanded enforcement constitute a direct violation of his civil[] rights….
Plaintiff expresses concern that the executive order he challenges calls for the Government to retaliate against those who hold beliefs or express opinions critical of the State of Israel or the Jewish community or religion. If that is how the Government interprets the measure or enforces the measure as so applied is certainly problematic under the First Amendment of our Constitution. [For more on how certain ways of enforcing the IHRA definition can violate the First Amendment, see here and here. -EV]
However, the Court interprets the measure as prioritizing efforts to curtail acts of violence, harassment or discrimination directed toward the Jewish faith and those supportive of the Jewish state rather than to punish those who merely hold opinions critical of these groups. The First Amendment does not protect acts of violence, harassment, or discrimination. In fact, laws long ago enacted prevent acts of violence, harassment and discrimination based on religious beliefs or political opinion. To that extent the Court views the executive orders as a statement of priority or emphasis rather than a change in substantive law.
