The spread of disinformation is one of the biggest risks to societies. Recent examples have been conspiracy narratives about COVID-19 vaccinations and false claims about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The trend is linked partly to competition among world powers, which is being played out in Africa too.
Across the continent, multiple foreign powers, including China, France, Russia, the US and others, are competing to shape public opinion. In most cases, states use legitimate approaches to get their messages across. But there are many recent examples of foreign powers spreading misleading or false narratives about current affairs.
For example, in 2020, Meta revealed that the French military was behind an online campaign to sway public opinion in the Central African Republic against Russia. And in 2022, the US was accused of leading a disinformation campaign targeting Arab-speaking communities.
There is evidence that Russian operatives are active spreaders of false information across the Sahel. China has also used state-controlled media to present its own strategic narratives on the African continent.
Strategic narratives, some true and some false, are essentially stories that political actors use to promote their interests and values, and shape how people perceive global events. The question then arises: what factors influence the success of strategic narratives?
In a recently published study, we looked at how prevalent Russian and Chinese strategic narratives are. We also explain what makes them popular. Our findings are based on a survey of 4,600 people in four African countries – Angola, Ethiopia, South Africa and Zambia – at the end of 2022. We selected these four countries because they have very different political landscapes, varying levels of engagement with China and Russia, and different historical experiences with foreign influence.
We found that most people believed common Russian and Chinese strategic disinformation narratives to be true. The main reason they did so was anti-US sentiment. That is, the more somebody felt the US was an enemy, or had a negative influence on their country, the more likely they were to say Chinese and Russian narratives were true.
These findings also matter for counter-disinformation strategies. When strategic narratives capitalise on deep-seated attitudes and geopolitical histories and alliances, mere debunking of disinformation by means of fact-checking or media literacy campaigns is unlikely to succeed on its own.
Russian disinformation is widespread
Our study builds on previous research about disinformation and its impact on public opinion in the global south.
We have previously identified the reasons why some people share disinformation, what people from different backgrounds do when they come across political disinformation, and what can be done to curb the spread of false information.
In our latest study, we found that Russia’s media outlets often portrayed Russia as a defender of sovereignty and traditional values, and painted the west as hypocritical or imperialistic.
Similarly, Chinese media – CGTN, China Daily and Xinhua – emphasised China’s role as a partner in Africa’s development while downplaying or denying negative aspects of Chinese influence.
We found that Russian narratives were more widely accepted than Chinese ones across all countries. We asked respondents whether two statements that were examples of Russia’s disinformation narrative were true. The statements were:
The war in Ukraine is a consequence of Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe
and
Sanctions against Russia are the main cause for the current food and energy crises.
More than 70% of survey respondents told us that they thought the statements were probably or definitely true.
Several fact-checking organisations have shown that these narratives are not true, but are commonly used by Moscow to advance its own strategic interests.
Chinese narratives were more polarising and offered the most striking differences between countries. When asked about the statement
If a war breaks out in Taiwan, it would be the United States’ fault
Only 3 in 10 Zambians said that it was true, compared to 6 in 10 Ethiopians.
Differences between countries were much smaller when we looked at this statement:
Foreign forces organised anti-government protests in Hong Kong in 2019.
Only in South Africa and Ethiopia did we find more than 50% of people believing this to be true.
One way to interpret these differences is by looking at the wider geopolitical alignment in each country at the time the survey was conducted.
In South Africa, despite the blocking of Russia Today (RT) on the satellite television service provider DStv in March 2022, Russian narratives still found significant support. This was likely influenced by the country’s membership of the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China South Africa) grouping, and the government’s refusal to side with the west in condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Russia also draws on “memory diplomacy” by reminding African audiences of its past support for African liberation movements such as the African National Congress to boost support for its war on Ukraine. South Africa is seen to drift away from its neutral stance towards stronger support for China and Russia.
Russian media are planning to capitalise on this sentiment by opening a bureau in Johannesburg.
In contrast, Zambia and Angola displayed more resistance to the foreign narratives. Angola’s historical ties with Russia, dating back to the cold war, did not translate into strong support for Russian narratives, perhaps due to the country’s ongoing efforts to diversify its international partnerships.
Anti-US sentiment a major factor
In Ethiopia, a key driver of the results appears to be anti-US sentiment. We found that 33% of Ethiopians believed the US to be an “enemy” (compared to 4% in Angola or 8% in Zambia), and 65% thought that US influence in their country was negative (compared to 17% in Angola or 22% in Zambia).
Anti-US rhetoric has been particularly prevalent in Ethiopian media and the political landscape in general in recent years, particularly after Washington’s criticism of the war in Tigray.
After considering multiple possible factors, we concluded that anti-US sentiment was the most consistent predictor of believing Russian and Chinese strategic narratives. In other words, those who saw the US in a negative light were much more likely to believe these narratives to be true.
We also found that the consumption of Chinese or Russian media had no effect on people supporting these narratives. What this means is that those who regularly consumed Chinese and Russian media content were not more likely to believe these narratives than those who didn’t consume this content. China and Russia have invested heavily in distributing their media content on the continent, but their audience and the impact of their media messages remains low.
Complex picture
Our research highlights the nuanced and complex ways in which public opinion forms across Africa. Disinformation does not operate in a vacuum. It is shaped by historical ties, economic dependencies and the local political landscape.
Counter-strategies would therefore have to include a focus on building positive attitudes and strengthening geopolitical ties to reduce the susceptibility to disinformation narratives.
Herman Wasserman receives funding from the International Development Research Center (Canada), Grant No. 109896-001
Dani Madrid-Morales and Saifuddin Ahmed do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
