From Ninth Circuit Judge Michelle Friedland's opinion today in Crowe v. Oregon State Bar, joined by Judge John Owens and District Judge William Orrick:
To practice law in Oregon, an attorney must be a member of the Oregon State Bar ("OSB"). An attorney must also pay annual membership dues, which are used to fund OSB's activities. Those activities include administering bar exams, formulating and enforcing rules of professional conduct, and establishing minimum continuing legal education requirements for Oregon attorneys. OSB also lobbies the state legislature and publishes a magazine called the Bulletin..
In the April 2018 issue of the Bulletin, OSB published two statements on "White Nationalism and [the] Normalization of Violence." The two statements were published on facing pages, surrounded by a single dark green border that was not present on the other pages of the magazine. The first statement had OSB's dark green logo on the top of the page, and it was signed by six OSB officers, including the President and the Chief Executive Officer. That statement said:
Statement on White Nationalism and Normalization of Violence
As the United States continues to grapple with a resurgence of white nationalism and the normalization of violence and racism, the Oregon State Bar remains steadfastly committed to the vision of a justice system that operates without discrimination and is fully accessible to all Oregonians. As we pursue that vision during times of upheaval, it is particularly important to understand current events through the lens of our complex and often troubled history. The legacy of that history was seen last year in the streets of Charlottesville, and in the attacks on Portland's MAX train. We unequivocally condemn these acts of violence.
We equally condemn the proliferation of speech that incites such violence. Even as we celebrate the great beneficial power of our First Amendment, as lawyers we also know it is not limitless. A systemic failure to address speech that incites violence emboldens those who seek to do harm, and continues to hold historically oppressed communities in fear and marginalization.
As a unified bar, we are mindful of the breadth of perspectives encompassed in our membership. As such, our work will continue to focus specifically on those issues that are directly within our mission, including the promotion of access to justice, the rule of law, and a healthy and functional judicial system that equitably serves everyone. The current climate of violence, extremism and exclusion gravely threatens all of the above. As lawyers, we administer the keys to the courtroom, and assist our clients in opening doors to justice. As stewards of the justice system, it is up to us to safeguard the rule of law and to ensure its fair and equitable administration. We simply cannot lay claim to a healthy justice system if whole segments of our society are fearful of the very laws and institutions that exist to protect them.
In today's troubling climate, the Oregon State Bar remains committed to equity and justice for all, and to vigorously promoting the law as the foundation of a just democracy. The courageous work done by specialty bars throughout the state is vital to our efforts and we continue to be both inspired and strengthened by those partnerships. We not only refuse to become accustomed to this climate, we are intent on standing in support and solidarity with those historically marginalized, underrepresented and vulnerable communities who feel voiceless within the Oregon legal system.
The second statement was signed by the Presidents of seven Oregon Specialty Bar Associations, which are voluntary organizations separate from OSB. It said:
Joint Statement of the Oregon Specialty Bar Associations Supporting the Oregon State Bar's Statement on White Nationalism and Normalization of Violence
The Oregon Asian Pacific American Bar Association, the Oregon Women Lawyers, the Oregon Filipino American Lawyers Association, OGALLA-The LGBT Bar Association of Oregon, the Oregon Chapter of the National Bar Association, the Oregon Minority Lawyers Association, and the Oregon Hispanic Bar Association support the Oregon State Bar's Statement on White Nationalism and Normalization of Violence and its commitment to the vision of a justice system that operates without discrimination and is fully accessible to all Oregonians.
Through the recent events from the Portland MAX train attacks to Charlottesville, we have seen an emboldened white nationalist movement gain momentum in the United States and violence based on racism has become normalized. President Donald Trump, as the leader of our nation, has himself catered to this white nationalist movement, allowing it to make up the base of his support and providing it a false sense of legitimacy. He has allowed this dangerous movement of racism to gain momentum, and we believe this is allowing these extremist ideas to be held up as part of the mainstream, when they are not. For example, President Trump has espoused racist comments, referring to Haiti and African countries as "shithole countries" and claiming that the United States should have more immigrants from countries like Norway. He signed an executive order that halted all refugee admissions and barred people from seven Muslim-majority countries, called Puerto Ricans who criticized his administration's response to Hurricane Maria "politically motivated ingrates," said that the white supremacists marching in Charlottesville, [Virginia] in August of 2017 were "very fine people," and called into question a federal judge, referring to the Indiana-born judge as "Mexican," when the race of his parents had nothing to do with the judge's decision. We are now seeing the white nationalist movement grow in our state and our country under this form of leadership.
As attorneys who lead diverse bar associations throughout Oregon, we condemn the violence that has occurred as a result of white nationalism and white supremacy. Although we recognize the importance of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the protections it provides, we condemn speech that incites violence, such as the violence that occurred in Charlottesville. President Trump needs to unequivocally condemn racist and white nationalist groups. With his continued failure to do so, we must step in and speak up.
As attorneys licensed to practice law in Oregon, we took an oath to "support the Constitution and the laws of the United States and of the State of Oregon." To that end, we have a duty as attorneys to speak up against injustice, violence, and when state and federal laws are violated in the name of white supremacy or white nationalism. We must use all our resources, including legal resources, to protect the rights and safety of everyone. We applaud the Oregon State Bar's commitment to equity and justice by taking a strong stand against white nationalism. Our bar associations pledge to work with the Oregon State Bar and to speak out against white nationalism and the normalization of racism and violence.
Daniel Crowe, an attorney and member of OSB, objected to the statements … [and] demanded a refund of his dues. OSB gave Crowe and other objecting members refunds for their shares of the cost of publishing the April 2018 issue of the Bulletin, plus interest. [But Crowe also sued OSB and its officers, claiming] that compulsory membership in OSB violated his right to freedom of association….
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment implicitly recognizes "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities" that it explicitly protects. The freedom of association "plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate." But the freedom of association (including the freedom not to associate) does not protect all "associations." Because the freedom of association is a corollary to other First Amendment rights, it only protects "associations to the extent that they are expressive." … When a mandatory association infringes freedom of association, that infringement is permissible if it "serve[s] a 'compelling state interes[t] … that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." We have referred to that test as "exacting scrutiny." …
When a plaintiff challenges a requirement that he join an organization, the plaintiff can establish an infringement on his freedom of association by showing that his membership in the organization impairs his own expression. The plaintiff can make that showing if a reasonable observer would attribute some meaning to his membership—because, for instance, a reasonable observer would assume that the plaintiff agrees with the organization's articulated positions—and he objects to that meaning….
Whether a reasonable observer will attribute any meaning to "membership" alone depends on the nature of a group. Obviously, membership in a political party sends an expressive message. Even if a person takes no other action to support a political party, a reasonable observer understands that membership in the political party, standing alone, says something about the person's views. But the word "membership" is used to refer to all sorts of relationships: A person might be a member of a public library, Costco, AMC, or, back in the day, Blockbuster. Those memberships may not send any message at all.
Whether a reasonable observer will attribute any meaning to such memberships will depend on context, and there may plausibly be circumstances where membership in a group becomes expressive. But as relevant here, the bare fact that an attorney is a member of a state bar does not send any expressive message. A state bar's primary function is to license, regulate, and discipline attorneys—activities that are essentially commercial in nature. And a reasonable observer understands state bar membership to mean only that the attorney is licensed by the bar. Thus, even when the bar engages in expression, a reasonable observer ordinarily would not interpret the fact that the attorney is a member of the bar to mean that the bar's activities reflect the attorney's personal views.
That can be true even if some of the state bar's expression is not germane to the bar's regulatory purposes….
But, in the particular circumstances of this case, Crowe has shown that a reasonable observer would attribute meaning to his membership in OSB because of the Bulletin statements. OSB endorsed the Specialty Bars' statement criticizing then-President Trump and suggested that all members agreed with it.
Specifically, the formatting and content of the two statements made it appear as though OSB essentially adopted the Specialty Bars' statement. OSB made the editorial decision to publish the two statements side-by-side, surrounded by a single dark green border that was the same color as OSB's logo. And OSB's statement echoed the themes in the Specialty Bars' statement, using strikingly similar language. For example, the Specialty Bars' statement "condemn[ed] speech that incites violence" and made clear that it was referring to then-President Donald Trump's speech specifically, offering several examples. OSB's statement likewise criticized the "systemic failure to address speech that incites violence." In context, one would assume that OSB's reference to "speech that incites violence" was also referencing then-President Trump.
OSB's statement also praised the Specialty Bars specifically. OSB said, "The courageous work done by specialty bars throughout the state is vital to our efforts and we continue to be both inspired and strengthened by those partnerships." By praising the "work" of the Specialty Bars, which would presumably include the immediately adjacent statement, and describing the relationships between OSB and the Specialty Bars as "partnerships," OSB again appeared to implicitly endorse the Specialty Bars' statement. The Specialty Bars, in turn, "applaud[ed] the Oregon State Bar's commitment to equity and justice by taking a strong stand against white nationalism," and "pledge[d] to work with the Oregon State Bar." Reading those expressions of mutual praise, one would interpret the two statements to be a reflection of OSB's and the Specialty Bars' shared views.
If OSB had made clear that its own statement reflected the views of OSB's leadership—and not its members—then there would be no infringement. But OSB suggested the opposite. Although the statement said "[a]s a unified bar, we are mindful of the breadth of perspectives encompassed in our membership," it immediately implied that the contents of its statement were one thing on which all members agreed.
It did so by saying that, given that breadth of perspectives, "we" would focus on "those issues that [were] directly within our mission," which was "gravely" threatened by the "current climate of violence, extremism and exclusion." That would seem to suggest that all members agreed with what was in the statement because it dealt with topics on which there was no "breadth of perspectives." The statement reinforced that idea by using "we" and "our" throughout in a way that purported to speak for all members of OSB. For instance, it said, "As lawyers, we administer the keys to the courtroom." That could only mean all OSB members, not the six OSB officers who signed the statement.
The implication that OSB was speaking on behalf of all the attorneys it regulates was accentuated by the fact that those attorneys are called "members," as opposed to something more neutral, such as "licensees." As we have explained, the fact that a state bar refers to attorneys as "members," standing alone, does not mean that a reasonable observer would think that an attorney shares the views of the bar. But the word "member" does connote a stronger relationship than just a regulatory one, which makes it more likely that a reasonable observer would read a statement like OSB's to actually speak on behalf of the attorneys it regulates.
The Bulletin statements make this case analogous to Carroll v. Blinken (2d Cir. 1992). There, students were required to pay an annual "activity fee" to their university, part of which was used to fund a policy advocacy organization called the New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. ("NYPIRG"). NYPIRG sought to advance "certain positions on issues of public policy," such as arms control and environmental protection, "through research, campus speakers, lobbying the legislature, intervening in lawsuits, community organizing, brochures, and other methods." According to NYPIRG's bylaws, any student who paid the activity fee was automatically a "member" of NYPIRG, and "on the strength of this by-law, NYPIRG claim[ed]" in its advocacy "to represent all students at the nineteen participating campuses."
The Second Circuit held that the automatic membership policy infringed the students' freedom of association. The court explained that "NYPIRG expressly forge[d] … a link" "in the popular mind" between its views and the students' views "when it proclaim[ed] that its 'membership' include[d] all fee paying [university] students" and when it "overtly and inaccurately claim[ed] to represent the interests of the [university] student body." NYPIRG thus "irredeemably transgressed the proscription against forced association."
Carroll counsels that if an organization trades on its membership in advancing its own views, a reasonable observer may come to (incorrectly) believe that the organization speaks for its members even though membership is mandatory, and in that circumstance, a membership requirement can infringe the freedom of association. Considering the totality of the circumstances here, OSB traded on its supposedly unified membership to bolster its own expression, fostering a misperception about the unanimity of its members' views.
Crowe has also established that the association impaired his own expression because he objects to the message sent by his membership. He testified at his deposition that he disagreed with the Bulletin statements and that he did not want to be associated with them. Crowe has thus established an infringement on his freedom of association….
Such an infringement on the freedom of association is nonetheless permissible if it survives exacting scrutiny. Under exacting scrutiny, the infringement must "serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." The Supreme Court has observed that [the] germaneness requirement "fits comfortably" within the exacting scrutiny framework in the state bar association context because states have a strong interest in "'regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services,'" as well as in "allocating to the members of the bar, rather than the general public, the expense of ensuring that attorneys adhere to ethical practices." That statement indicates that when a state bar requires attorneys to associate with germane activities, that requirement survives exacting scrutiny.
{On this point, we agree with the Fifth Circuit, which has held that "[c]ompelled membership in a bar association that is engaged in only germane activities survives [exacting] scrutiny." McDonald v. Longley (5th Cir. 2021). But we disagree with the Fifth Circuit's holding that if a state bar engages in nongermane activities, compelled membership is necessarily unconstitutional. See also Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass'n, 86 F.4th 620, 632-34 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that a state bar violated its attorneys' right to freedom of association by, among other things, tweeting about the health benefits of eating walnuts and promoting a holiday charity drive). As we have explained, in many circumstances, membership in a state bar, standing alone, has no expressive meaning, and the public will not associate the bar's members with the bar's activities. In those circumstances, the membership requirement does not infringe the freedom of association—even if the bar engages in nongermane activities such as offering dietary advice or promoting a charity drive.}
Consistent with that principle, we held in Gardner v. State Bar of Nevada (9th Cir. 2002), that even if the public might associate attorneys with a state bar's expressive activities, that association is permissible if the activities are germane. There, the State Bar of Nevada engaged in a public relations campaign that sought to "dispel any notion that lawyers are cheats or are merely dedicated to their own self-advancement or profit." The campaign instead promoted the notion that lawyers "strive to make the law work for everyone.". An attorney objected to the campaign in part because he believed lawyers "are supposed to serve their clients, not 'everyone.'" …
In this case, by contrast, OSB engaged in nongermane conduct by adopting the Specialty Bars' statement. The "guiding standard" in determining whether an activity is germane is whether it is "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or 'improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of the State.'" At least some of the Specialty Bars' statement was not germane. The statement opened by describing the Specialty Bars' "commitment to the vision of a justice system that operates without discrimination," but much of its criticism of then-President Trump did not relate to the justice system at all—for instance, it criticized Trump for describing Haiti and African countries as "shithole countries." Although preventing violence and racism can relate to improving the legal system, the connection here was too tenuous. See Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de P.R. (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a bar's activities that "rest[ ] upon partisan political views rather than on lawyerly concerns" are not germane). Because the Specialty Bars' statement was not germane, OSB's adoption of the Specialty Bars' statement was not germane either. OSB has not offered any other justification for associating its members with the Bulletin statements. Thus, the infringement does not survive exacting scrutiny….
The remedy for this violation need not be drastic…. [E]ven if OSB does engage in nongermane activities, in situations in which those activities might be attributed to its members it could include a disclaimer that makes clear that it does not speak on behalf of all those members. OSB could also lessen the risk of misattribution by following the California State Bar's lead and referring to attorneys as "licensees," rather than "members."
I'm pretty skeptical of this reasoning, in part because (1) I don't think any "reasonable observer would read a statement like OSB's to actually speak on behalf of the attorneys it regulates," at least in the sense of inferring that any particular lawyer "assume[s] that the plaintiff agrees with the organization's articulated positions," and (2) I don't think that labeling an attorney as a "member" of the bar rather than a "licensee" should make any constitutionally significant difference in any reasonable observer's (or reasonable lawyer's) mind. But in any event, it seems like a noteworthy decision.
Scott D. Freeman and Adam C. Shelton (Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at the Goldwater Institute) and Luke D. Miller (Military Disability Lawyer LLC) represent plaintiffs.
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